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This dissertation presents a new view that emphasizes the role of intra-elite fights 
in understanding the failure to consolidate democracy during the Second Spanish 
Republic. The two traditional explanations have emphasized the action of “blocks” 
and often reflect the ideological tensions behind the interpretation of the Second 
Republic. Rather than seeing elites as blocks or focusing on ideological divisions, 
my view focuses on the heterogeneity of interests within elites and how the 
redistribution of political and economic rents during the Republic relates to the 
support or animosity of elite factions vis-à-vis the republican government. 
I apply my view to one specific Spanish elite -the Army- showing that, contrary to 
traditional interpretations, the military was a non-monolithic organization that 
was divided into different factions with conflicting interests. I explore the impact 
that factional military interests had on officers’ chosen side (rebel or loyal) during 
the Spanish Civil War that ended the Republic. The econometric analysis uses a 
new data set that identifies officers’ sides and uses information from military 
 
 
yearbooks to follow officers’ individual histories between 1910 and 1936. The results 
confirm that the Army was a non-monolithic organization where factions behaved 
differently and responded to the impact from republican military reforms. Officers 
in favored corps and those that enjoyed greater promotions between 1931 and 1936 
were more likely to support the republican regime. I also explore the effect of 
hierarchy on officers’ choice. Results show that subordinates tended to follow the 
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”Competing explanations [in History] 
tend to have a heavy ideological cast” 
Douglass North (1981: 52) 
 
“Truth and love against the force of evil” 
Christy Moore, Viva la Quinta Brigada 
In the introduction to the French edition of his startling account of his months at 
Auschwitz Birkenau, Elie Wiesel points that “oblivion would mean danger and 
insult. Forgetting the victims would be like killing them again” (2007:23).1 One 
could think that in Spain, where the end of the Republic was brought by a Civil 
War with almost 600,000 victims and cruel political repression, a similar thought 
is shared, but it is not. The interpretation and study of the Spanish Civil War is 
still dominated by the passions and political tensions that surrounded the beginning 
of the conflict.  
During Franco’s thirty-six year dictatorship, many generations of Spaniards 
studied the military coup that started the Civil War as an uprising aimed at 
avoiding the communist dictatorial threat that loomed over Spain in 1936. The 
dictatorship issued from the Civil War often referred to terms like “holy crusade” 
or similar metaphors to justify the coup against the republican government in July 
1936. The Spanish Civil War was literally seen as a fight between good and evil, a 
struggle between defendants of the faith and totalitarian atheist communists.  
With the arrival of democracy and the increase in freedom of expression and 
political rights after Franco’s death in 1975, the alternative view of the Republic 
                                     
1 « L’oubli signifierait danger et insulte. Oublier les morts serait les tuer une deuxième fois ». 
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(which reflected the view of “the other band” in the Civil War) regained force in 
Spain. From this perspective, the republican regime represented an ideal of 
democracy that extended political rights to all sectors of the Spanish population 
(women voted for the first time in 1933), attempted a modernization of society by 
separating the Church from the State and redefining the privileges and control the 
Catholic Church had traditionally exerted over culture and the education system, 
and represented one of the first serious attempts to redistribute power in favor of 
the masses. For proponents of this view, the Republic is an iconic event in the 
political imaginary against which the current social order that emerged after 
Franco’s death is compared. For some, the Republic embodied an idea of secular 
liberal democracy that should have been pursued after the dictatorial break. The 
current transition to democracy is criticized for being oblivious to the role that 
some political figures had during Franco’s regime.2 The claims of associations 
fighting to recover the bodies of relatives who died during the war, the recognition 
of republican clandestine opposition to Franco’s dictatorship, and the investigation 
of Franco’s crimes against humanity are subjects of debate in today’s Spanish 
political and judicial arenas.  
To be clear, this characterization is over-simplified and does not pay justice to the 
rigorous work that historians have done in the recent years. If during Franco’s 
dictatorship the official propaganda dominated the explanations and views of the 
Republic, the last decades have benefitted from an impressive number of academic 
                                     
2 Manuel Fraga Iribarne is one of the best examples of the integration of Francoist political figures 
in the Spanish transition to democracy. Fraga was minister in many Franco’s governments between 
1962 and 1969. After Franco’s death, he was deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior 
(1975-1976) and one of the “fathers of the (democratic) Constitution” of 1978. He founded and 
became the president of the main Spanish conservative party (Alianza Popular which became the 
Partido Popular in 1989). He occupied political posts as president of the region of Galicia and 
senator until his death in 2012.   
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works about this period of Spanish history. But, even in the work of historians, 
one finds the footprint of political passions in the implications derived by the two 
historical views that dominate the debate about the Republic and its failure to 
consolidate democracy. One side argues that the sources of instability and the 
failure of the republican regime to consolidate democracy came from conservative 
elites (Preston, 2007; and Casanova, 2010, are two useful syntheses of this 
approach). Conservative elites blocked the reformist efforts of the republican 
governments and worked to overthrow the republican regime because it threatened 
their control over the Spanish political and economic systems. In this view, the 
military coup of July 1936 was the ultimate proof of powerful conservative groups’ 
lack of loyalty towards the Republic. The alternative view argues that leftist 
organizations and the partisan political framework set by the ruling republican-
socialist coalition between 1931 and 1933 were the main factors that paved the way 
to political polarization and conflict in Spain (Payne, 2006; Álvarez and Villa, 
2010). According to this view, the Constitution approved by a republican-socialist 
coalition in 1931 was partisan and alienated conservative groups. The radicalization 
of the Socialist faction and its abandonment of the parliamentary game after the 
victory of the center-right in the 1933 elections together with anarchist political 
violence and activism were the final sources of the political polarization that ended 
in the Spanish Civil War. These two views come to opposite explanations for the 
failure of the Republic and relate to contemporary political passions and divisions 
when evoking the failure of the regime that Payne named “Spain’s first democracy.” 
The Spanish Republic offers an interesting case study not only to historians but 
also to economic historians interested in institutional development and institutional 
change. Besides having a durable influence in today’s Spanish political imaginary, 
the republican regime was the most ambitious attempt to reform the Spanish 
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political and economic institutions. For the first time in Spanish history, women 
were given the right to vote and mass political parties were organized to compete 
in free elections. Yet, despite the greater “inclusiveness” of the republican political 
system, the republic is a an example of a failed democracy that could not contain 
the instability and violence that erupted in July 1936, leading to the Spanish Civil 
War and Franco’s dictatorship. Understanding why the Republic failed goes 
beyond ascertaining historical facts. Other social sciences must be mobilized in 
order to interpret the events that punctuated the life of the Republic and to analyze 
the incentives and mechanisms that guided the actions of relevant political and 
economic agents.  
Despite the profound disagreement between the two traditional interpretations in 
understanding the Republic, there is little doubt that significant progress has been 
made in our knowledge of the facts that led to the failure to consolidate democracy 
in Spain. Some historians have gone as far as saying that “the most relevant 
questions [about the Civil War] are already answered” (Casanova, 2014). This 
dissertation argues that, far from having a final answer for “the most relevant 
questions”, our understanding of the Republic, the Civil War and the failure to 
consolidate a more open and competitive social order in 1930s Spain can benefit 
from recent developments in institutional development, economics, and political 
science. The 75 years that have elapsed since the end of the Civil War give 
opportunities to develop a new view that goes beyond the passions and ideological 
cleavages that have dominated the debate thus far.  
To be clear, I do not deny the validity of the two traditional interpretations of the 
Republic. Rather, I develop an alternative analysis of the Republic that adds to 
the current ones. There is no doubt that both traditional views are consistent with 
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many important aspects of the Republic, like the conspiracies developed by those 
elites that traditionally held power before the Republic or the political polarization 
that resulted from the action of radical workers’ organizations. However, my 
emphasis on intra-elite conflict is equally important because reformist governments 
in power between 1931 and 1933 altered and redistributed the rents accruing to 
political and economic elites. The Army is one of the clearest examples of the 
relevance of intra-elite divisions. When the coup against the Republic broke out in 
July 1936, the military split into two sides. The fact that the Army did not act as 
a “block” (by unanimously following the coup or opposing to it) is central to 
understanding why the coup led to a long three-year conflict rather than immediate 
change of regime or the persistence of the republican status quo.  
Following the block of power perspective, the main determinant in officers’ choices 
has been ideology: liberals remaining loyal to the republican government and 
conservatives joining the rebel ranks. Without denying the importance of ideology 
in officers’ choices, I show that the way republican military reforms altered the 
economic and professional rents perceived by military factions help us understand 
officers’ likelihood to go rebel or remain loyal to the Republic. 
The new view of the Republic challenges a basic assumption of the existing 
historical approaches.  Rather than assuming that homogenous liberal and 
reactionary  groups existed, and that interaction between those homogenous groups 
explain the arc of the Republic, my approach focuses on the internal dynamics and 
the sources of violence and tension within Spanish political elites. It departs from 
the traditional accounts in two ways. First, it emphasizes the need to focus on elite 
dynamics during the Republic. In this sense, the new view of the Republic delves 
into the main idea suggested by Tuñón de Lara (1967) that the internal dynamics 
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of Spanish social orders predating the Republic were dominated by intra-elite 
relationships between different groups that made up the blocks of power. Second, 
rather than blocks of homogeneous actors, Spanish elites are taken as non-
monolithic organizations formed by several factions with different and conflicting 
interests.  These differences are traced through the history of the Republic. The 
idea that elite groups cannot be characterized by a representative agent with a 
unique objective function and its importance in understanding political and 
economic development was developed by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009, 
hereafter NWW; see also, North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast, 2013, for case studies 
of developing countries). The importance of factionalism in understanding elite 
dynamics has also been studied by Rivero (2013), who traces the analytical 
implications of factionalism in the civil control of the military and the formation 
of military juntas and dictatorships. 
My emphasis on intra-elite conflict during the redistribution of economic and 
political power between 1931 and 1936 departs from the “elites vs. masses” 
framework. It reduces the role played by far-left workers’ organizations highlighted 
by traditional explanations and focus on elite heterogeneity. It results in a new 
research agenda to study different aspects of the Republic. I do not claim that the 
traditional views are invalid or that the limited access view provides a definitive 
and ideologically free approach to the life of the Republic. I argue that the 
traditional views are too simple and elites’ interests and factional conflict is a useful 
field of study to understand the life of the republican regime. I draw on important 
advances and insights of the traditional views and use recent advances in social 
science to address limitations in older methods by emphasizing the importance of 
intra-elite conflict and the interaction between the political and the economic 
sphere to understand elites’ conflicts. This, hopefully, improves our understanding 
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of the economic and political development issues involved in the failed attempt to 
consolidate democracy in Spain. When the first shot was fired on July 17, 1936, 
the conflict had escalated to become ideologically polarized and incendiary claims 
were made to destroy the rival (in the name of God or in the name of the future 
proletarian revolution). By then, it was already too late for any hope of establishing 
a stable and more democratic regime in Spain. 
My approach is applied to the Spanish Army during the Republic. The republican 
regime operated in a framework without political control of the military and the 
men on horseback were an important element of the Spanish coalitions that ruled 
the country. In other words, the Republic operated in an environment in which the 
support or animosity of military factions was an important determinant of the 
degree of institutional instability. As pointed out above, the military coup of July 
1936 that led to the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship bears witness to 
the importance of the Army in understanding the sources of instability that the 
republican regime faced. My study of the Spanish Army focuses on the different 
factions that composed the Spanish Army and how the republican military reforms 
between 1931 and 1933 affected their interests.  
The application of my view to the Army in the Republic has two main 
contributions with respect to the existing literature. First, I build a new dataset 
for active officers in 1936. The dataset combines data in Engel (2008) and the 
Spanish military yearbooks to provide information on the side officers’ chose during 
the civil war as well as histories of individual officers between 1910 and 1936. The 
dataset develops the first quantitative measurement of officers’ identification with 
Spanish military factions, their rank, their corps, and professional trajectory during 
the Republic. Second, I offer the first quantitative study of the impact that 
republican military policies had on officers’ careers and how it relates to officers’ 
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likelihood to support or rebel against the Republic in 1936.  In other words, were 
officers and factions harmed (benefited) by republican military reforms more (less) 
likely to revolt against the Republic? 
A probit regression is used to estimate officers’ probability of rebelling against the 
Republic in July 1936. The results confirm that the Army was not a monolithic 
organization. Military factions behaved differently and responded to republican 
military reforms. Aviation and the Assault Guard (two of the most favored corps 
during the Republic) showed greater loyalty towards the epublican regime. The 
impact that republican reforms of the promotions system had on military factions 
also appears as a significant determinant of the side an officer chose. In particular, 
the results show that promoted officers were more likely to support the republican 
regime.  Revisions to promotion procedures in 1931 and 1933 harmed the prospects 
of officers belonging to the africanista faction, therefore increasing their likelihood 
to rebel. Finally, I also explore the effect of hierarchy. Results show that 
subordinates with a rebel senior officer were more likely to rebel. Given that 
members of the africanista faction held higher ranks in 1936, the hierarchical effect 
offers another indirect channel through which republican reforms could have 
affected military factions and the number of rebel officers in July 1936.    
The lack of political control of the military and the study of the Army constitute 
the most exhaustive application of my view to Spanish elites. In order to show how 
my view can be applied to other elites and its pertinence in understanding the 
institutional arrangement in which the Republic operated, I also provide an 
introduction to the characteristics of the Spanish political and economic systems. 
The republican regime held the most free and inclusive elections in Spanish history 
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until 19783, but the Republic still operated in an institutional arrangement that 
lacked some of what Hofstadter (1967) characterized as some of the most important 
characteristics of a competitive political system, like a legitimate opposition. The 
economic system, which I treat through the cases of the financial system and trade 
regulations, continued to be characterized by a non-competitive logic. My analysis 
points to a non-trivial balance between persistence and change in the Republic: the 
republican regime changed the nature of the coalition that ruled Spain, but the 
republican coalition operated in a non-competitive institutional arrangement that 
had important similarities with the ones that characterized previous regimes: elite 
factions fought for being the beneficiaries of economic regulations giving access to 
markets and other lucrative economic privileges. If elites were key in the Spanish 
social orders before 1931 (Tuñón de Lara, 1967), the same was true during the 
Republic. 
Two comments concerning my study of the Spanish political and economic system 
are in order. First, they should be taken as complementary, not independent. The 
logic in one domain reinforced the characteristics of the other in what NWW term 
“double balance”. The lack of openness and competition in the Spanish economy 
was sustained by a not fully competitive political system and vice versa. Second, I 
do not present a comprehensive analysis of Spanish politics and economics during 
the Republic. The examples offer, at best, a brief incursion on the political and 
economic spheres to illustrate the non-competitive logic and the lack of open access 
that dominated the institutional arrangement in which the Republic operated. I 
also hope that they constitute an additional argument in favor of the intra-elite 
                                     
3 It took three years since Franco’s death to legalize parties, approve a new Constitution and hold 
open, competitive and fair elections again. 
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perspective that I propose. The examples also serve to illustrate new fields beyond 
the Spanish Army where my view of the Republic can be applied.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a historical background 
and summary of the Republic. Chapter 3 presents two of the most important 
approaches developed to understand the life of the Republic: the “block of power” 
and the “polarization view”. Chapter 4 presents my alternative view on the 
republican regime and uses the Army to show how it can be applied in studying 
Spanish elites during the Republic. Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical 
application of my view to the case of the Spanish Army. Chapter 9 analyzes the 
political and economic systems in Spain during the republican regime to show that 
some basic characteristics of consolidated democracies were missing and that the 
economy was still subject to a non-competitive logic in some important aspects. 
This chapter develops the implications of my view beyond the particular case of 






“For a whole century, the greater share of Spain’s 
political worries centered around the military!” 
Manuel Azaña (quoted in Payne, 1967: 272) 
The violent end of the Republic in a Civil War started by a military coup was not 
an isolated event in Spanish history. In fact, most regimes that predated the 
Republic were ended by military interventions. Lack of political control of the 
military and the resulting intervention of men on horseback was common. A brief 
look at regimes before the Republic shows that instability, fights between elites, 
and military intervention in politics were the rule rather than the exception.  
During the reign of Queen Isabella II (1843-1868), Spain experienced at least eight 
pronunciamientos4 (military coups) aimed at reforming Spanish political life and 
changing the government (Carr, 1966: xx-xxiii). Vilar summarized the mechanics 
of these coups and shows how conflict between elite factions commonly took the 
form of military coups (1977: 65): 
“Periodically a well-known process took place. Exiles, secret societies, often 
foreign intrigue, obscurely encouraged by partisan opinion, and aware that 
legal channels had been closed by official pressure, elected a general, 
frequently a leader in exile, or at least in disgrace.  (…). A manifesto was 
read to the troops, who abandoned their barracks. Arrests were carried out, 
commands changed, while express messengers and telegrams called on other 
garrisons, previously approached, to make a pronouncement in the same 
terms. Madrid usually declared the situation under control (this was often 
true since out of scores of failures only half a dozen pronunciamientos were 
successful).” 
                                     
4 Brenan (1960) documents eighteen pronunciamientos for the same period. This discrepancy may 
be due to the difficulty of drawing a difference between military riots, mutinies, and 
“pronunciamientos”. To some extent this can be taken as an indicator of how the Army was 
frequently involved in plots against the government. 
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The reign of Isabella II was followed by an unsuccessful Liberal Constitutional 
Monarch (Amadeo of Savoy, 1870-1873) and an ephemeral Republican experiment 
that last twelve months (1873-1874) with four different presidents. The First 
Republic finished after General Martinez Campos carried out a successful 
pronunciamiento that restored the Bourbon Monarchy to Spain. King Alfonso XII 
became the head of a Constitutional Monarchy during the period known as La 
Restauración (the Restoration) between 1874 and 1923.5   
The main architect of the Spanish Restauración was Antonio Cánovas del Castillo 
(1828-1898). Cánovas was an admirer of the British Parliamentary democracy, but 
Spanish political and economic reality led him to construct a political system in 
which the main concern was finding a stable coalition between some factions of the 
most powerful elites in Spanish society. In Brenan’s words: 
“Cánova’s work had been to patch up provisionally the differences that in 
the previous century had separated Church, Army, and politicians by 
allowing them all to enrich themselves together (…)”. (Brenan, 1960: 13). 
The result was a system in which two political parties (the Liberal and the 
Conservative) alternated in power through conveniently arranged elections. The 
manipulation of electoral results was particularly evident in rural areas, where 
caciques (heads of clientelistic networks) distributed political favors and, when 
necessary, coerced voters or altered the list of voters (so dead people “voted”) to 
ensure that the “correct” list obtained the majority. The progressive degeneration 
of the political equilibrium after Canova’s assassination in 1898; disputes between 
military factions; and other social, political, and economic tension contributed to 
                                     
5 Vilar (1977) dates the Restauración in the 1874-1917 and Brenan opts for a disconcerting 1874-
1898. I have chosen the period 1874-1923 in order to associate the term “Restauración” with a very 
concrete political order characterized by a constitutional monarchy and a “controlled democracy” 
as explained below. Primo de Riveras’s dictatorship (which starts in 1923) marks a clear end to this 
political arrangement and thus it is considered as the end of the Restauración.  
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the increasing instability of the Spanish social order. In 1923, the King welcomed 
a pronunciamiento led by General Primo de Rivera’s military to establish a 
“Directorate” (military dictatorship) that kept the monarch as head of the State. 
The “military Directorate” established by Primo de Rivera became a civil one in 
1925 and a Consultative Assembly in 1927. After Primo de Rivera stepped down 
in 1930, two shorter and softer dictatorships took place under the rule of Berenguer 
and Aznar. In April 1931 Berenguer’s cabinet organized what was considered a 
“superficial harmless municipal poll”.  Despite the usual electoral manipulations, 
the elections discredited the Directorate that had governed in Spain since 1923 
with the King’s support.  Republican parties won in the biggest cities where 
manipulations were more difficult (in part due to the smaller strength and presence 
of caciques and clientelistic networks). It was impossible to ignore the support that 
Republican parties received in the biggest cities. After verifying that he could not 
count on the support of the Army, the King fled the country and a provisional 
republican government took power. The Republic (1931-1939) was peacefully 
declared on April 14th, 1931. 
Far from an improvised government, the republican cabinet in charge after the 
King’s escape had been agreed upon in the Pact of San Sebastián (1929). The secret 
meeting in San Sebastián assembled the main political figures opposing the 
dictatorship and the King. The group signed a program based on three pillars: the 
country would be divided into autonomous communities6, political and religious 
liberties would be protected, and Spain would become a republic. After the 
                                     
6 The Spanish autonomous communities are often considered as a de facto federalist organization. 
Nevertheless, some important differences between autonomous communities and federal states exist: 
the ability to change the constitution, for example, only exists at the national level. 
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Republic was declared, the revolutionary committee started to work on a 
constitution that embodied the other points agreed to in San Sebastián. 
Elections to form the parliament that would draft the new constitution were held 
in July 1931. The coalition of moderate and left-wing parties that formed the 
backbone of the Pact of San Sebastián obtained a comfortable victory: 250 out of 
330 seats were in hands of Left Republicans, socialists and regionalist Catalan 
parties. Consequently, the new government mirrored the provisional government 
in place before the elections. 
The new constitution, approved in December 1931, was modeled on the Weimar 
Republic and was a ”child of its time.” The constitution shared many features with 
other European inter-war constitutions (Corcuera Atienza, 1991). The Constitution 
concentrated legislative and ministerial power in a single-chamber parliament to 
avoid the control of the Senate that elites traditionally held. 
Besides drafting the new constitution, the government placed in power by the July 
1931 elections attempted a series of important social and economic reforms 
affecting important aspects of the political and economic Spanish system like the 
Army, the relationships between the Catholic Church and the state, and land 
distribution. 
The reforms of the Army aimed at reducing its size to reduce the excess number 
of officers that the Army had had since the mid-nineteenth century (Payne, 1967), 
reform the methods of promotion, eliminate some ranks, and redesign the existing 
corps and the administrative structure of the Army. Chapter V presents a detailed 
analysis of the most relevant military reforms and their impact on the different 
military factions that coexisted within the military. 
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The Concordat of 1851 between the Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish state 
recognized Catholicism as the official religion of the country. The Church had 
played an important role in the legitimatization of previous regimes in Spain and 
had enjoyed a de facto monopoly on higher education. Article 26 of the constitution 
approved in December 1931 proclaimed religious freedom and separation between 
Church and State. It aimed at depriving some Catholic groups of the special 
privileges they had traditionally enjoyed. The Jesuits (one of the most powerful 
and wealthy groups of the Catholic Church in Spain) were particularly affected: 
Article 26 called for the dissolution of Orders that required a special oath in 
addition to the normal canonical vow, something that only applied to the Jesuits 
and that resulted in their dissolution. Jesuits’ properties were sequestrated even if, 
in practice, the Order had many opportunities to evade the law (Jackson, 1972).  
The Agrarian Reform was brought to the Parliament and approved in the fall of 
1932.  It addressed the problems posed by the unequal land distribution in the 
center and Southwest parts of Spain. There, latifundia (big landholdings largely 
owned by the Spanish aristocracy) coexisted with an abundant mass of landless 
population. The reform included the expropriation of some type of lands (mostly 
uncultivated land and lands that were systematically worked by tenants and not 
the landlord himself) and created an Institute of Agrarian Reform (Instituto de 
Reforma Agraria, IRA) to distribute land among a number of families. 
The impact of the reforms (particularly the ones affecting the redistribution of 
land) was limited by the inefficient administrative system in charge of its 
implementation and the opposition the reforms raised among affected individuals 
and organizations.7 More importantly, the reforms were limited by the victory of 
                                     
7 As an example, the IRA expected to distribute land to 60,000-75,000 families per year. Only 12,260 
families received land between 1932 and 1934 (Malefakis, 1971) 
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center and moderate parties in the elections of November/December 1933. The 
Center-Right governments8 in place between December 1933 and December 1935 
implemented a series of counter-reformist policies aimed at paralyzing and, 
whenever possible, reversing the policies established by the previous left-wing 
government concerning the distribution of land or the reform of the Army. The 
opposition of radical left organizations to the Center-Right government was 
violently expressed in the Catalan regional upsurge and the workers’ revolutionary 
strike in Asturias in October 1934. It took two weeks for the Army to suppress the 
revolution in Asturias. The Catalan revolt was much more short-lived: barely one 
day. 
The radical left and liberal Republican parties united their forces in the so-called 
Popular Front, and won the elections in 1936. Reformist policies resumed. A 
military coup on July 18th, 1936 brought an abrupt halt to the ”regular” political 
life of the Republic. The coup led to a three year Civil War and ultimately resulted 
in the victory of the putschist officers and Franco’s thirty-six year dictatorship 
(1939-1975). 
  
                                     
8 The plural in “governments” is completely justified: between December 1933 and December 1935 





Traditional Views of the Second Spanish Republic 
The passions that surround the visions of the Republic and Civil War also translate 
to the academic views of the period that have dominated the debate. I divide 
current explanations and views of the Republic into two categories: the “block of 
power view” and the “polarization view”. The “block of power view” focuses on the 
role that conservative elites (Army, Church, landowners...) had in opposing the 
reforms of the Republic and contributing to its fall. This view places the conflict 
in an “elites vs. masses” framework. The “polarization view” highlights the political 
tensions brought by anarchist and socialists, particularly after November 1933. It 
is not difficult to see how the two sides of the political spectrum in today’s Spain 
might feel more attracted towards one explanation or the other. Both, the “block 
of power” and the “polarization view” fit the facts that occurred during the 
Republic but provide different explanations for the failure to establish and 
consolidate democracy. At a deeper level, the two views present a fight between 
two clearly defined, homogenous groups (democrats vs. elites, radical leftists vs. 
moderates...). Chapter IV presents my alternative view that emphasizes the 
heterogeneity of interests within elites and intra-elite conflict.  
III.1.The ”Block of Power” View  
The concept of a “block of power” was developed by the Spanish historian Manuel 
Tuñón de Lara (Tuñón de Lara, 1967). A “block of power” is defined as the 
coalition of elites that controls and exerts power over a territory. Tuñón de Lara 
applied the concept to the Restauración (1874-1923) and the military and civil 
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dictatorships that followed (1923-1931). I use the ”block of power view” to 
designate one traditional view of the Republic that takes its name from its emphasis 
on the opposition to the republican regime manifested by these elites that 
dominated the country between 1874 and 1931. Scholars supporting this view 
consider that conspiracies and disloyalty stemming from these groups (Church, 
landowners, Army...) were the main source of instability during the Republic and 
the ultimate reasons for the Republic’s failure. 
The “block of power view” frames the life and instability of the Republic as an 
“elites vs. masses” conflict. Attempts of the republican-socialist coalition in power 
between 1931 and 1933 to redistribute power in favor of the masses alienated 
industrialists, landowners, the Catholic Church and other elites that had 
dominated Spanish politics and economics before the Republic.  
The archeologist Pere Bosch-Gimpera, who lived during the Republic, analyzed the 
politics of his time at a conference at the Universitat de Valencia in 1937 in the 
following terms: ”under the Second [Republic], the superstructure was still alive 
and the dominant castes had not resigned themselves to step down”9 (2007: 487). 
Fifty years later, Tuñón de Lara used a similar argument: “the key fact is that 
traditional elites preserved their economic power and their social influence but were 
not involved in power. Clearly, besides creating a conflictive situation, this was 
likely to result in the break of legitimacy” (Miralles and de la Granja, 1994: 127).10 
                                     
9 ”Sota la segona [república], la suprastructura tenia encara massa supervivències i les castes 
dominants no s’han resignat a deixar el camp lliure” 
10 ”El  hecho  clave  es  que  las  elites  tradicionales  conservaron  su  poder  económico  y, en  
general,  su  influencia  social,  pero  no  tuvieron  participación  en  el  Poder.  A  nadie  escapa 
que  este  hecho,  de  por  sí,  entraña  una  situación  conflictiva,  y  que  a la  larga  es  susceptible  
de producir  una  ruptura  del  consenso  sobre  la  legitimidad” 
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Preston (2007) and Casanova (2010) formulate two recent syntheses of the “block 
of power” ideas. 
The “superstructure” hindering the political action of the Republic had a monolithic 
character manifested in the elites’ opposition to the reform policies attempted by 
the first liberal-socialist governments. The popular expectations raised by the 
liberal-socialist attempted reforms in land and industry were rapidly dashed by the 
problems and obstacles of implementing the reforms, partly because of elite 
obstructionism. The victory of the Popular Front and the return of liberal 
Republicans to government in 1936 after two years of conservative rule was a new 
opportunity to reactivate the reformist agenda, but then ”the coup de grâce, the 
challenge that finally overthrew the Republic by force of arms, came from above 
and from within - that is to say, the military command and the powerful ruling 
classes that had never tolerated it ” (Casanova, 2010: 37). 
In summary, the reforms attempted by left-wing republicans and socialists faced 
the opposition of conservative groups (Army, Church, landowners...) that 
represented the interests of the old Spanish elites. These elites, when in power 
between 1933 and 1935, showed no interest in acting according to the Republican 
political framework. It is true that during the rule of conservative governments, 
some far-left organizations (including the most radical wing of the Socialist Party 
which had been part of the first republican governments between 1931 and 1933) 
played a role in destabilizing the regime, but this view emphasizes the old elites’ 
political and military opposition as the key to understanding the instability of the 
Republic. General Sanjurjo’s failed military coup in 1932 was the first serious proof 
of the problems the Republic had with controlling military plots and violence 
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organized by factions in the army. The fatal military coup in 1936 represented the 
culmination of old elites’ disloyalty to the regime.  
In some important aspects, the “block of power view” can be taken as an 
application avant la lettre of Acemoğlu and Robinson’s model of democratization 
and institutional change (2006). In Acemoğlu and Robinson’s model, elites (the 
initial holders of political and economic power) only accept the redistribution of 
power that happens in democracy whenever the masses are able to organize and 
pose a credible threat to elites’ survival. Transition to democracy is the long-term 
credible commitment that elites can offer to avoid being eliminated by better 
organized masses. However, Acemoğlu and Robinson also consider the possibility 
of having an unconsolidated democracy in which the balance of power can quickly 
shift back in favor of elites. The reversion usually takes place through a coup that 
brings economic and political power back to elites and ends with democratization 
(2006: 224-246).  
III.2.The “Polarization View” 
The “polarization view” emerged as a reaction to the emphasis the “block of power 
view” puts on conservative elites’ obstruction of Spanish democratization. It 
emphasizes political polarization and tensions provoked by leftist parties and 
unions as the main obstacles to consolidating democracy in Spain. Proponents of 
the “polarization view” argue that the Constitution approved by the republican-
socialist coalition in 1931 lacked a necessary consensus and pushed a partisan view 
that alienated center-right and conservative parties (Linz, 1994; Payne, 2006; 
Álvarez Tardío and Villa García, 2010). 
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Drawing on Sartori’s model of political polarization (Sartori, 1976), Linz 
emphasizes political polarization as the main source of instability during the 
Republic: 
”Although the army became the ultimate cause of the breakdown, the crisis 
and loss of legitimacy of the regime and the polarization in the society had 
progressed to great extremes before the army acted. It would be a mistake 
to consider this insurrection the main cause. In more than one sense, the 
regime had already broken down” (1978: 198) 
Sartori’s definition of polarized pluralism includes a political system with at least 
five parties. The government is represented by a coalition that has to face ”anti-
system parties” that undermine the legitimacy of the regime, and mutually 
exclusive opposition parties that attack the government from both the right and 
the left. These elements erode legitimacy and increase instability in the political 
system.  It seems questionable that the anti-system parties played an important 
role in Spain.11  Nonetheless, Linz uses this theoretical framework to explain the 
main problems of the Republic. The first element of the argument is the 
constitution approved by the left Republicans and Socialists in power between 1931 
and 1933. Linz argues that the Constitution promoted exclusion and pushed a 
partisan view for the new Republican regime, resulting in increased opposition from 
conservative parties. 
Payne points to a second element of polarization and disloyalty taking place after 
1934: the radicalization of the Socialist Party: 
”Truly serious violence developed only after political polarization became 
extreme in 1934. The shift by the Socialists to violence and insurrectionary 
tactics created a much more severe polarization in Spain than ever 
developed in [Italy, Germany and Austria] where the Socialists and even the 
communists followed more moderate tactics” (1990: 283-4) 
                                     
11 The Fascist and the Communist parties were residual at least until 1936. They became more important 
during the Civil War (1936-1939). 
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In summary, in the “polarization view” the main problems of the Republic were 
increasing polarization and loss of legitimacy. Two factors explain these facts: the 
(partisan) constitutional framework designed by the Liberal-Socialist government 
in 1931 and the radicalization of the Socialist Party that contributed to violent 
revolts and repression after 1934.12 This view emphasizes the inability of the 
Republic (in particular the left-wing coalition that controlled the government 
between 1931 and 1933 and after February 1936) to control political violence and 
implement a system based on broad, moderate coalitions and loyal political 
opposition.  
On April 10, 1977 (eighteen months after Franco’s death and in the middle of the 
transition to democracy), the conservative newspaper ABC still echoed a rough 
and politicized version of the “polarization view” in its critique of the legalization 
of the Communist Party. Its editorial read: “Those [the communists] that dragged 
Spain to the worst conflict in its history with their mistakes, intransigence, and 
methods and that made necessary so many victims and sacrifices to achieve peace, 
are suddenly put on an equal footing with those that offered their lives to defend 
Spain from what the “Communist Party” longed for and almost achieved: the 
admission of the country among (...) the countries behind the Iron Curtain” (p. 2, 
my emphasis).13 
                                     
12 Authors like Linz (1978) qualify this picture, with its extreme critique of the action of left-wing 
parties, and also point out that the mismanagement of the repression of the revolutions in Asturias 
and Catalonia by the center-right government was an additional source of polarization. 
13 “Quienes arrastraron a España, por sus errores, por su intransigencia y por sus métodos al 
agravamiento de la más terrible conflagración de nuestra historia, haciendo necesario para la paz 
tantísimos muertos y tantísimos sacrificios, se ven, del día a la mañana, en plano de igualdad con 
cuantos ofrecieron sus vidas para defender a España de aquello que el “Partido Comunista” anhelaba 
y a punto estuvo de conseguir: la instalación en nuestra patria en la órbita en la que hoy giran (...) 
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A New View of the Second Spanish Republic and the Army 
“Esa historia puede ser también interpretada de otra forma” 
[This may also be interpreted another way]. 
    Julián Casanova (2010: 147) 
The two traditional views of the Republic provide valuable insights to 
understanding some of the problems that the consolidation of democracy faced 
during the Republic. My view does not disprove them, but aims at providing a new 
perspective that opens new questions and fields of study to understand the 
incentives that relevant groups and organizations had to rise against the republican 
regime. I see the republican regime as a coalition of elites and I emphasize the role 
of intra-elite competition in the dynamics of the Republic.  
The arrival of the Republic in 1931 implied a change in the composition of the 
coalition that ruled the country. An important part of the problems that the 
republican regime faced in containing violence must be sought in the redistribution 
of political and economic power between elites. This section applies the basic 
characteristics of my view to the Spanish Army.  
Rather than framing the Republic as an “elites vs. masses” scheme or focusing on 
the role of far-left organizations, my approach emphasizes the conflicts between 
elite factions to understand some important sources of instability during the 
republican regime. The republican regime implemented a new intra-elite 
arrangement and I focus on identifying the relevant political and economic elites 
during the period, the factions into which they were divided, and how republican 
reforms redistributed power between factions. I show that elites were not 
monolithic groups and the conflicts of interests between the different groups that 
composed them are a key to understanding the institutional dynamics of Spain 
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during the Republic. The stability of the republican regime was affected by the 
conflict between those factions that grew from the new social order implemented 
after April 1931 and those that lost political and economic privileges. 
I use the Army as an example to illustrate how my view can be applied to one 
particular elite group. The Army was an important organization in determining 
the fate of regimes predating the Republic and even a superficial look at the history 
of the republican regime reveals that it remained key in affecting the stability of 
the Spanish institutional arrangements in the 1930s. As a major political player, 
the military shows how Spanish elites were divided into different factions that held 
different and conflicting interests. This chapter depicts the main divisions within 
the military that form the basis for the empirical analysis to test how those conflicts 
related to officers’ propensity to be for or against the republican government when 
the military coup broke out in July 1936. 
IV.1.The Army as a Political Elite in Spain 
Focusing on elites means studying “persons who, by virtue of their strategic 
locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to 
affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley, 2010: 163). The power 
and influence of elite members is inseparable from the organizations they belong 
to. In Wallis and North’s words, “elites are always connected to organizations in 
some way” (2014: 2).  Army officers were some of the most important political 
elites in the country.  
Besides finding economic and political support from powerful economic groups like 
landowners or industrialists, Spanish regimes also needed the backing of relevant 
sectors of the Army to ensure its stability. Men on horseback were part of the elite 
coalition that sustained or hindered the consolidation of different regimes and 
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governments, and their role in the political system went beyond being “an 
instrument at the service of political blocks or currents of thought”1 (Lleixà, 1984: 
86). The Spanish Army was a relevant political player in its own right and its 
interests are important in understanding the path of Spanish development. 
The role of the military as a relevant player in the process of political and economic 
development in developing countries is not new. In his theory of the emergence and 
consolidation of national states, Tilly (1992) distinguishes four stages in warfare 
and state organization that he terms patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, 
and specialization. The stage that best characterizes Spain in the 1930s is 
nationalization:  “a period (...) when states created mass armies and navies drawn 
increasingly from their own national populations, while sovereigns absorbed armed 
forces directly into the state’s administrative structure, and similarly took over the 
direct operation of the fiscal apparatus, drastically curtailing the involvement of 
independent contractors” (1992: 29). The Spanish Army in the 1930s, however, was 
still far from Tilly’s stage of specialization in which the Army specializes in military 
operations and the government takes over the economic control and management 
of the Army. Tilly’s specialization stage is close to NWW’s notion of political 
control of the army (2009: 169-181). In their view, political control of the military 
is a complex idea that encompasses the selection of military leadership by civil 
authorities, the control of military force through nonmilitary means, and the 
separation of decisions about when to fight and how to spend on fighting from the 
direction of military activity. The Spanish Army came under effective political 
control only in the 1980s (Serra, 2010). The Republic operated in an institutional 
                                     
1 “[La actuación del Ejército en los últimos cien años de la historia de España] ha sido propia de un 
instrumento puesto al servicio de un bloque de partidos y corrientes de opinión” 
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environment in which the Army was a relevant political player and its interests 
were relevant for the stability of the ruling coalitions. 
Violence and military interventions were a constant in Spanish political history 
well before the Republic. During Isabella II’s reign (1843-1868) Spain had one civil 
war, two successful military pronunciamientos (military coups) that led to changes 
of government, several failed mutinies, and a final military coup that overthrew 
Isabella II. The brief reign of Amadeo I (1870-1873) and the chaotic First Republic 
(1873-1874) were also dominated by military unrest that ultimately led to the fall 
of the first republican experiment in Spain.  
During the Restauración (1874-1923) the Army was still a key player in the 
dominant coalitions. As Puell de la Villa points out, “the Army was considered an 
autonomous class with its own structures of power that ran parallel to the ones of 
the civil administration (...) and that directly depended on the monarch” 
(2009:114). Military officers sat in the Senate and the Parliament and the Minister 
of the War between 1874 and 1917 was always an Army officer. The political 
relevance of the Spanish military was embodied in laws that increased its political 
power. In March 1906, for example, the Law of Jurisdictions gave the military 
courts control over all the “crimes against the Fatherland and the Army”. The Law 
of Jurisdictions was a step in the process whereby “the officer corps came to 
consider itself the ultimate arbiter in politics” (Preston, 2007: 28). Another 
significant law reflecting the political power of the Army was the Royal Order of 
January 15 1914, which allowed direct communication between the King and Army 
officers. This Order was particularly significant for two reasons. First, it confirmed 
that, despite being a parliamentary monarchy de jure, during the Restauración the 
Army enjoyed a de facto political power not subject to parliamentary control. 
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Second, the law was symptomatic of the King’s need to attract support from sectors 
of the Army. Some scholars see the 1914 Royal Order as another step in the 
consolidation of the King-soldier (single ruler) that commanded general obeisance 
from the Army (Cardona, 1983: 78; Puell de la Villa, 2009: 110). Rather than 
confirming the existence of a single agent with total control of the Army, the law 
was indicative of the King’s need to attract and ensure the support of powerful 
officers and sectors of the Army in order to forge a coalition that stabilized the 
regime. In Lleixà’s words, the King acted as “the principal hinge that united the 
civil and military branch of the state” in a social order in which the Army had to 
be “coordinated but not subordinated to the remaining public powers” (1986: 66, 
his italics).2 
The end of parliamentary monarchy in the Restauración was also marked by 
military intervention. In 1923, Primo de Rivera, an Infantry officer, took power 
after a military coup and established a dictatorship that lasted seven years (1923-
1930). Between 1923 and 1925 Primo formed a “Military Directory” (Directorio 
Militar) in which the Army took control of the majority of the Spanish political 
system. In González Calleja’s words, “the Directory freed the Administration from 
political parties and turned it to hundreds of pressure groups, mainly the Army, 
which rapidly occupied the main administrative posts” (2005: 69).3 After 1925, the 
regime became a “Civil Directory” but Primo stayed as the head of the government, 
only subordinated to the King. After Primo stepped down in 1930, two shorter 
                                     
2 “[El Ejército como centro de poder] debía ser luego coordinado, que no subordinado, con los 
restantes poderes públicos. (...)La Corona (...) actuaba como el principal gozne unitivo de las ramas 
civil y militar del Estado”  
3 “El Directorio libró a la Adminstración del influjo de los partidos politicos para entregarla  
indefensa al de ciertos grupos burocráticos de presión, especialmente el Ejército, que se lanzó con 
avidez a ocupar los principales puestos gubernativos” 
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dictatorships led by Berenguer and Aznar (both Army officers) followed until April 
1931, when the Republic was declared. 
Regimes before the Republic varied in character but in all of them the Army was 
a relevant political player in its own right. NWW’s words restate the inevitable 
conclusion: “If active support of the military forces is necessary to hold or obtain 
control of the civilian government institutions, then a society does not have 
political control of the military. If military officers serve as officers (...) in the 
civilian government, for example as legislators or executives, then a society does 
not have political control of the military” (NWW, 2009: 170). The Republic 
inherited and operated in an institutional arrangement lacking political control of 
the military. 
IV.2.Heterogeneity of Interests within Elites  
Focusing on intra-elite conflict immediately suggests that elites do not share a 
unique goal and are divided into different factions that hold different and 
conflicting interests. However, Marxist sociology or neoclassical theories of the state 
tend to depict elites as monolithic organizations (Tilly, 1992; North, 1981; 
Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2006 and 2012; Bates, 2008). Elites or social classes are 
modeled as single agents whose goals are given by their (unique) objective 
functions.4 The Army is not an exception to this view: it is often the case that the 
military is either subsumed as a single “elite agent” or is taken as elites’ coercive 
agent to prevent democratization (Acemoğlu, Ticchi, and Vindigni; 2006).  
                                     
4 Institutional dynamics and tensions are often explained by the fight between elites masses 
objective function. Marx’s class struggle or Acemoglu and Robinson’s Economic Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy (2006) are examples of this view. 
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Single agent theories are useful theoretical artifacts, but elite organizations differ 
from this paradigm in crucial ways.5 The Spanish Army provides a good example 
because it contained many factions with conflicting interests. This was not a 
particularity of the Spanish military because, as Rivero points out, “internal 
dissensions within the armed forces are the rule rather than the exception” (2013:5). 
The plurality of interests within the military meant that, when deciding over a 
specific military policy, Spanish governments attracted some military factions but 
alienated others. This is particularly relevant in understanding the political 
dynamics of Spain in the 1930s because, as NWW explain, developing societies lack 
a Weberian state: violence is dispersed among different groups, and the state is 
unable to get a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. These societies try to 
preserve order by creating elite coalitions that reflect a double balance6 between 
economic and political power, but threats from other elites that are not part of the 
coalition persist. As a result, developing societies are more unstable and more likely 
to suffer through coups and civil wars than developed countries. The single agent 
theory of the state puts the cart before the horse by assuming that the result of 
political and economic development (i.e. the concentration of coercion in the state) 
already exists. Weberian states or sufficiently centralized states (Acemoğlu and 
Robinson, 2012) characterize developed societies, not developing ones. In a 
framework with dispersed violence, the Army is more than a simple agent of 
political and economic elites: it is part of the elite factions that dominate politics 
                                     
5 Despite their ubiquitous use in Economics and their pertinence to answer some particular 
questions, the limits of single agent models to deal with certain economic problems are being raised 
in other fields besides institutional development. For instance, in his study of the evolution of 
inequalities and the distribution of income Piketty states that “economists have neglected the 
distribution of wealth, (...) partly because of the profession’s undue enthusiasm for simplistic 
mathematical models based on the so-called representative agents” (2014: 16). 
6 NWW define the double balance as “a correspondence between the distribution and organization 
of violence potential and political power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of 
economic power on the other hand” (2009: 20). 
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and economics in developing societies; indeed the Army itself is composed of 
factions.7 
In the case of the Spanish military, divisions existed along geographical and 
corporatist lines. From a geographical point of view, the Army was divided into 
two groups: the peninsulares or junteros (officers posted in the Iberian Peninsula), 
and the officers in the Spanish North-African colonies (africanista officers). The 
africanistas were strong proponents of promotions by combat merit, whereas the 
peninsulares preferred promotions strictly determined by seniority (see next 
chapter for a deeper discussion of factions’ conflicts, their importance in Spanish 
history, and the way they were affected by Republican military reforms). 
The interest of organizations within the Army were also differentiated along 
corporatist lines. The Aviation Corps was the newest corps in the Army and its 
independence was not well established in 1931. The greater or smaller independence 
accorded to the corps by different regimes influenced the support that aviators 
brought to them. Also, the more technical corps (i.e. Artillery and Engineers) 
preferred a military education system with separate academies from less technical 
units (i.e. Infantry and Cavalry). Conflicts around education between artillerymen 
and engineers on the one side and infantrymen and cavalrymen on the other side 
were also recurrent in Spanish history.  
The conflicts between military factions might seem technical but, as shown in the 
next chapters, they had important consequences in terms of redistributing 
economic and professional power among elite (military) factions and are linked to 
officers’ likelihood to rise against the Republic. Those intra-elite fights for economic 
                                     
7 The USSR and its control of the Army probably represents the most important exception to what 
otherwise is a (rather) general rule for developing countries: the army is not under political control 
and appears as a major political player in its own right.    
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and professional prestige resulted in greater support from those factions that won 
with republican reforms and greater likelihood to rebel stemming from those 






Military Factions in the Spanish Army 
“The old internal divisions that existed within 
the Army before 1931 did not disappear with 
the coming of the Second Spanish Republic” 
Puell de la Villa (2012: 83) 
The Army might seem to be the one group within the Spanish elite where we 
should least expect to see competing factions and economic ties that link or alienate 
those factions to the ruling coalition. Not only is the Army widely viewed as a 
monolithic organization, but ideology has always played a key role in 
understanding the Army’s split in July 1936. This chapter shows that economic 
and professional conflicts between military factions were significantly associated 
with officers’ likelihood to rebel or remain loyal to the republican government when 
the military coup broke out.  
The view of the Army as a homogenous group has traditionally been based on 
military values like discipline and respect of hierarchy. The increasingly 
conservative character attributed to the Army since the 1870s reinforces a view of 
the Army as the executor of the ruling elites’ wishes against potential threats from 
masses or others (both internal and external). The Army was a major player in 
Spanish politics. The military used its power to hold and promote its own interests 
as an organization and the diverse interests of its members. When studying General 
Mola’s motivations to lead the plot that produced the 1936 military coup against 
the Republic, Payne points out that “Mola was determined that the revolt would 
be basically an army movement, not obligated to any special interests. (...) Like 
most officers, he was uninterested in political parties and political ideologies.” 
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(1971:94). Understanding the interests of the military is important in itself for the 
light it sheds on the motivation of officers during the Republic and Civil War. It is 
also important, however, because it challenges the idea that the Army had a single, 
monolithic, and homogenous interest in bringing down the Republic. This chapter 
studies the different groups and interests that coexisted within the Army and the 
impact that republican military reforms had on these. I use a newly constructed 
dataset to explore the impact of republican military reforms on officers’ careers 
and use that information to explain and predict why individual officers’ chose to 
side with the Republic or the rebels during the Spanish Civil War.  
One could argue that the idea of different interests within the Army is not 
something new. Did not the military coup of July 1936 become a Civil War 
precisely because the Army split into two sides? How does my view help to explain 
the split with respect to traditional views? The split of the Army in 1936 has 
traditionally been explained by ideological divides within the military: conservative 
officers supported the coup whereas liberal or left-radical factions remained loyal 
(Navajas, 2011, is one of the clearest examples of this view). My view points to the 
redistribution of political and economic power between elites to understand 
factional incentives to revolt or support the republican government, so it departs 
from traditional studies’ focus on understanding the sources of variation in officers’ 
differential support to the republican government.  
The most important difference between my view and traditional modelling of elites 
is my emphasis on the heterogeneity of interests within elites. This chapter deals 
with the study of the different factions that coexisted within the Spanish Army, 
their interests, and how the Republic and previous regimes adopted policies that 
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redistributed power between factions. This constitutes the basis for the empirical 
analysis developed in the next chapter. 
V.1. The Traditional View of the Army  
Despite the fact that the end of the Republic was triggered by a military coup and 
that studies of the Spanish Army are abundant, there has been little systematic 
research on officers’ behavior during the Republic and the influence that republican 
military reforms had on officers’ sides during the Civil War. The Army and its 
political importance are documented in Payne (1967), Boyd (1979), Ballbé (1983), 
Cardona (1983), Seco (1984), Lleixà (1986), Busquets and Losada (2003), and Puell 
de la Villa (2009). There are also many studies of the army and military reforms 
during the Republic (Aguilar Olivencia, 1986; Ruiz Vidondo, 2004; Alpert, 2006; 
Navajas, 2011). The main events during the military coup of July 1936 are 
described in detail in Salas (1940). Puell de la Villa (2012) is one of the most recent 
attempts to quantify the divisions of the Army in July 1936. None of these provide 
a quantitative multivariate analysis to understand the importance that republican 
military reforms and military factions had on the military coup that started the 
Spanish Civil War. This chapter adds to the recent literature that studies the 
influence that institutional and legal rearrangements had on the behavior of 
political and economic actors during the Republic. Domènech (2012) and 
Domènech and Miley (2013) are the two most recent efforts in that direction. They 
study how labor conflict and mobilization in rural Spain during the Republic 
followed legal and structural reforms in the labor market that favored the actions 
of labor unions. This chapter also complements the evidence of politicization, the 
use of clientelistic networks, and the politic appointments in the Spanish 
bureaucracy during the Republic shown in Lapuente and Rothstein (2013). Finally, 
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the view and institutional framework established in this chapter relates to the 
literature on political and economic development of which Tilly (1992); Acemoğlu 
and Robinson (2006, 2012); and North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) are the most 
important recent contributors. 
How is the Army seen by the “block of power view” and the “polarization view”, 
the two views that have traditionally dominated the interpretation of the Republic 
(see chapter III)? Within the “elites vs. masses” analytical framework, proponents 
of the ”block of power view” usually depict the Army as an organization that 
defended the interests of landowners, industrialists, bankers, and the privileged 
conservative groups that organized the 1936 coup to regain power. The Army was 
an integral part of the “elite block” that opposed the reformist attempts of the 
Republic to redistribute power in favor of the masses:  “the masters of social and 
economic power were united with the Church and the army in being determined 
to prevent any attacks on property, religion or national unity” (Preston, 2007: 40). 
The army is viewed as little more than the elites’ military arm. The military 
alliance with Spanish elites is often explained by arguing that the Army grew 
increasingly conservative after 1874 (Navajas, 2011) and could not accept the 
regional concessions to Catalonia during the Republic because they attacked the 
unity of Spain (Preston, 2007: 47, 58).  
 Important changes in the relationship between the Army and the republican 
government occurred in the months that followed the declaration of the Republic. 
Between 1931 and 1933, Manuel Azaña approved a series of military reforms that 
had different impacts on groups within the military, particularly on officers. These 
reforms reconfigured the relationship between the Spanish government and the 
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military factions, and they influenced officers’ likelihood to revolt against the 
Republic when the military coup that started the Civil War broke out in July 1936.  
The importance of Azaña’s military reforms in influencing officers’ sides in July 
1936 is explained by political changes during the Republic. The military coup 
happened five months after the Frente Popular won the elections held in February 
1936. The Frente Popular was a liberal-socialist coalition similar to the one that 
had attempted a series of reforms on distribution of land and the relationships 
between the State and the Church between 1931 and 1933. Azaña’s military 
reforms were part of the 1931-1933 reformist programs. After center-right 
governments had stopped and partly reversed the earlier reforms between 1933 and 
1935, the return of liberal forces to power in 1936 (with Azaña as President and 
the main political figure of the republican government) was interpreted as the 
return to the reformist programs of the first two years of the Republic. The military 
factions that lost with Azaña’s reforms between 1931 and 1933 had good reasons 
to worry about their prospects with the return of liberal government in 1936.  
V.2. Military Factions, and Republican Military Reforms  
The most important changes in the Spanish Army during the Republic took place 
during Manuel Azaña’s term in office as the Minister of War between April 1931 
and September 1933. Some scholars emphasize the legalism of Azaña’s reforms and 
his desire to limit the influence of the Army in Spanish politics (Cardona, 1983: 
117), while others emphasize his attempts to reaffirm the political neutrality of the 
military (Navajas, 2011: 92). But Azaña’s reforms could not be politically neutral: 
the Minister faced political choices that, given the conflicts of interests within the 
Army, would necessarily benefit some factions and hurt others. Many 
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contemporary testimonies to the 1931-1933 military reforms bear witness to the 
existence of losing factions and discontent in certain military sectors (e.g. 
Cebreiros, 1931; Mola, 1940:925-1170).  The military coup in July 1936 took place 
only four months after the elections in February, and two months after Manuel 
Azaña was named President of the Republic in May. Understanding how Azaña’s 
1931 and 1933 reforms affected the factions in the Army is crucial to understanding 
the incentives military groups had to support or oppose the republican ruling 
coalition in July 1936.  
V.2.1. Corporatist Divisions in the Army 
The most important Army corps were Artillery, Engineering, Infantry, Cavalry, 
and Aviation corps. Each of these corps had actively been involved in politics or 
conflicts that shaped the life and stability of regimes before the Republic. 
The Aviation corps is a good example of the Spanish Army’s involvement in politics 
and the changing nature of the military alliances that each regime established. 
After playing an active role in disputes and conspiracies against Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship, the Aviation corps was one of the major beneficiaries under the 
Republic. Republican military reforms consolidated the corps and increased its 
professional and economic standing. During his mandate as Minister of the War 
between 1931 and 1933, Azaña cancelled all the decrees against aviation officers 
approved by Primo de Rivera, increased the independence of the corps vis-à-vis the 
remaining structure of the Army when creating the Cuerpo General de Aviación, 
and gave aviators economic bonuses for their services (Cardona, 1983: 157).  
Corps in the Army had rivalries based on different interests concerning military 
education or methods of promotion. The most important corporatist conflict was 
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between Artillery and Engineers and Infantry and Cavalry. Artillery and Engineers 
were the most elite branches and received longer and more technical educations. 
These corps defended the existence of separate academies with respect to Infantry 
or Cavalry. Primo created a General Military Academy where all the corps shared 
the first two years of studies, increasing the animosity of engineers and artillerymen 
towards his regime. During the first years of the Republic, Azaña aligned with the 
interests of the technical corps by closing Primo’s Military Academy and 
reestablishing three military academies: one for the Infantry, Cavalry, and 
Quartermaster corps; another for the Artillery and Engineers corps; and a third for 
Military Health corp. Officers pursued their entire careers within these corps. 
Artillerymen and Engineers were also strong supporters of promotions determined 
by seniority, rather than promotions based on combat merit. Methods of 
promotions are studied in the next section because they were a key aspect that 
generated divisions in the Army between troops in Africa and the mainland. 
Some officers in the Spanish Army were part of the Assault Guard (Cuerpo de 
Seguridad y Asalto). This police force specialized in the suppression of 
demonstrations in large cities and was under the authority of the Spanish Interior 
Ministry (Ministerio de la Gobernación). Members of the Assault Guard had to be 
“strong and athletic youths, taller than 5’11” and of proven republican loyalty”8 
(González Calleja, 2012: 113).It was considered one of the most loyal republican 
units. 
For other corps whose interests were not directly affected by Azaña’s military 
reforms (e.g. Civil Guard or Frontier Guards), expectations on their loyalty vis-à-
                                     
8 “Sus agentes habían de ser jóvenes fuertes y atléticos, con una estatura superior a 1,80 m y de 
probada fidelidad a la República”. 
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vis the republican government in 1936 are less clear. The Civil Guard was a 
militarized police force in charge of preserving order in rural areas. Based on their 
historical dependence on old Spanish elites, González Calleja states that “during 
the Republic, civil guards kept their reticence towards the regime” (2012: 103), but 
he also recognizes that in 1936 the government of the Frente Popular eliminated 
from its ranks those officers significantly involved in the repression against leftist 
movements in the previous years.  
V.2.2. Promotions and Geographic Divisions in the Army 
The second division in the Spanish Army was along geographical lines and revolved 
around the methods of promotion preferred by the geographical factions that 
coexisted within the Army. Officers in Spain were divided into three broad rank 
categories (Table 1): the highest category was the General Officers (GO, which 
included the ranks of Lieutenant General, Major General, and Brigadier General), 
the second group was the Senior Commissioned Officers (SCO; Colonels, 
Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors), and the third group was the   Junior 
Commissioned Officers (JCO; Captains, Lieutenants, and Alféreces). For each 
rank, officers were classified on a scale according to their seniority in the rank. 
Whenever there were vacant posts in a given rank, top officers on the scale of the 
rank below were eligible for promotion. Depending on the law in force, promotions 
between ranks or promotions within the scale in a given rank could also be 
determined after remarkable actions in the battlefield (promotions by combat 
merit) or by appointment of the military authority (promotions by election). 
Officers’ attached great importance to changes in their position on the scale 
because it determined their eligibility to be promoted to the next rank and increase 
their economic and social standing in the Army.  
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The geographical factional conflict between troops posted in mainland Spain 
(Peninsulares) and those posted in Africa (Africanistas) revolved around the 
preferred method of promotion. The former preferred promotions strictly 
determined by seniority, whereas the latter were strong proponents of allowing 
promotions determined by combat merit. Peninsulares’ criticism of combat merit 
often pointed to problems of arbitrariness and favoritism. In this sense, the military 
journal La Correspondencia Militar wrote in 1912: 
“There are 2,300 senior officers of Infantry and Cavalry who do not want to 
be politicians, and who reject any government policy that tries, by means 
of favoritism, to introduce hated rivalries into the Army. They regard any 
reward for service that is opposed to their vehement desire to ascend by 
seniority as a menace to their only safeguard, the scale of seniority” (Payne, 
1967: 124). 
Despite its ecumenical and apolitical pretensions, the article itself is indicative of 
the political activism of the Army in its attempts to influence the methods of 
promotions and the tensions that existed around that issue. Favoritism and 
arbitrariness aside, the reasons for that type of activism were linked to officers’ 
self-interest and the impact that methods of promotion had on the careers and 
economic rewards they expected. On one hand, Africanista officers were regularly 
involved in combat against native tribes in North Africa between 1910 and 1927, 
and therefore defended promotions by combat merit as a way to obtain faster 
progress through the scale. On the other hand, Peninsulares opposed promotion by 
combat merit because, lacking opportunities for combat, they could not benefit 
from that type of promotion. Allowing promotions determined by combat merit 
harmed their future prospects in favor of the Africanista faction. This was 
particularly worrying in an Army that suffered a severe problem of excess officers. 
Nazario Cebreiros, an officer of the Spanish Army in the first half of the twentieth 
century, showed how self-interest loomed behind officers’ defense of one method of 
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promotion over the other. This is how Cebreiros described officers that benefited 
from promotions by combat merit during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship:  
“When the Juntas [peninsulares’ lobbies9] had an unyielding force, they were 
junteros [i.e. peninsulares] and fierce defendants of promotions by seniority 
when they were at the [Iberian] Peninsula; but if, following their desires or 
by chance, they crossed the strait [of Gibraltar], then they became rapidly 
convinced that promotion by seniority was not in the interest of the State”10 
(Cebreiros, 1931: 14).  
Thus, rather than acting as the agents of liberal or conservative elites in Spain, 
officers “would be more concerned with promoting their own interests as military 
men above or outside of party conflicts” (Payne, 1967: 37). The governments’ 
decision over the methods of promotion would attract the support of the 
peninsulares (if emphasis was put on seniority) or the Africanistas (if promotions 
by combat merit were allowed). Decisions over methods of promotion were 
important determinants of the support that geographic factions of the Army gave 
to Spanish governments. 11 
In a series of laws passed between 1924 and 1926, Primo de Rivera allowed 
promotions by combat merit12 and by election13. The Republic inherited a military 
structure where combat merit and election had determined several officers’ ranks. 
                                     
9 More precisely, The Military Defense Juntas were peninsular organizations of military men who 
“were opposed to Africanistas, the méritos system, the palace clique, and the generals” (Payne, 1967: 
127). 
10 “Cuando las Juntas tenían una fuerza incontrastable, eran junteros: y terribles defensores de la 
escala cerrada, mientras estaban en la península; pero si, por voluntad o por suerte, pasaban el 
Estrecho, entonces se convencían rápidamente de que la escala cerrada no convenía a los intereses 
del Estado (...).” 
11 To a certain extent, those decisions also reflected the relative force of each faction. When in 1917 
the government approved a law that restored promotions by combat merit, the peninsulares reacted 
creating the Defense Juntas and forcing the fall and creation of a new government. One of the first 
measures of the new government was restoring the preeminence of promotions determined by 
seniority as demanded by the peninsular faction (Alpert, 2008: 126; Cardona, 1983: 145). 
12 Law of May 11, 1924 
13 Law of July 26, 1926. 
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In another controversial law, Primo had also eliminated the closed scale14 for 
Artillery and Engineers, - an event without precedent in the history of these corps 
which had always relied on seniority to determine the promotions in their ranks. 
Between 1931 and 1933, Azaña reversed Primo’s policies and implemented a series 
of military reforms that altered the promotion system. Two decrees passed in 1931 
cancelled Primo’s promotions by elections15 and revised those promotions that the 
dictator passed on combat merit grounds.16 Promotions were cancelled except if, at 
the moment of revision, they could be justified using the seniority criteria. Many 
officers who had been promoted by Primo lost position in the scale as a result of 
Azaña’s revisions of promotions by combat merit.  
Far from a technical debate, the reform of methods of promotion had a considerable 
political impact in Spain. In his diary, Azaña echoes the rumors that Melquiades 
Álvarez, an important political figure of the Republic, “has agreed to combat in 
the Parliament the cancellation of promotion by combat merit”17 (1981: 20). The 
interests of the Army were important political issues during the Republic and 
military factions had enough political relevance to make their voices heard in the 
Spanish Parliament. 
Azaña’s reforms of the methods of promotion were completed with the passage of 
a law on May 2, 1932 that established the promotion criteria followed during the 
Republic. The law was partly inspired by a law of 1918, which had been approved 
under the pressure of Peninsulares and other proponents of the seniority criteria 
                                     
14 The “closed scale” was another term to designate systems in which promotions were only 
determined by seniority. 
15 Order of May 18, 1931. Only the promotions by election that could be justified on seniority 
grounds were maintained. 
16 Order of June 3, 1931. 
17 “Otros afirman que Melquíades se ha comprometido a combatir en las Cortes la anulación de los 
ascensos por méritos de guerra” 
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for promotions. The republican-socialist government established that promotions 
would be determined by seniority within the ranks corresponding to JCO, SCO, 
and GO (See Table 1). In addition to the seniority criteria, promotions from JCO 
to SCO (i.e. from Captain to Major) or from SCO to GO (i.e. from Colonel to 
Brigadier General) required the successful completion of a course and a final exam. 
The reform of promotion methods in 1932, as well as the reversion of many of 
Primo’s promotions, affected officers and military factions’ attitude vis-à-vis the 
Republic through three different channels. First, by strengthening the role of 
seniority and study in determining promotions, the 1932 law favored peninsulares’ 
interests and alienated the Africanista faction. Second, emphasis on seniority was 
also in line with the interests of those corps historically attached to the closed 
scale, namely engineers and artillerymen.  Third, the officers who lost positions or 
were demoted a rank after revising Primo’s promotions by combat merit would 
have been more likely to be against the newly formed Azaña’s republican 
government in 1936.18  
V.2.3. Elimination of Ranks 
One last aspect of Azaña’s military reforms did not affect any military faction in 
particular but had significant consequence for some officers’ career prospects. In 
1931, a decree eliminated the rank of Lieutenant General, the highest rank in 
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers Corps.19 This measure affected the 
officers that in 1931 aspired to achieve the rank of Lieutenant General in the future, 
                                     
18 On April 19, 1932, Azaña wrote in his diary that General Goded, who was executed four year 
later after his failed attempt to lead the military coup in Catalonia, was “very angry because the 
reforms cut off his career” (Azaña 1981: 459; “está muy dolido de que las reformas le hayan cortado 
la carrera”) 
19 Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra  n. 132, June 17, 1931, p. 788. 
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namely Majors and higher ranks. By worsening their professional prospects (and, 
of course, the economic rewards and prestige that were attached), it is possible 
that these officers were more likely to oppose Azaña’s government in 1936 
(Cardona, 1983). 
The empirical study focuses on the impact of these four republican military reforms 
on the choices of officers in 1936: cancellations of promotions by election and 
combat merit and establishment of promotions by seniority, the creation of 
separate military academies, the greater independence and economic rewards given 
to aviators, and the disappearance of the rank of Lieutenant General. Needless to 
say, each active officer in 1936 could have been affected in conflicting ways by 
these policies. An africanista aviator that held a rank higher than Major in 1931 
had reasons to support the republican government in 1936 (Azaña had benefited 
his corps), but also reasons for being against it (the revisions of promotions by 
combat merit and the establishment of the seniority system went against the 
africanistas’ interests and the elimination of Lieutenant Generals harmed the 
prospects of those holding the rank of Major or higher in 1931). Table 2 summarizes 
the different policies and the way they affected the different groups and factions 
that coexisted within the Spanish Army. One of the virtues of the multivariate 
analysis performed in Chapter VII is to isolate the relationship between each 
different dimension of officers’ interests and the likelihood to rebel against the 
republican government. Before stepping into the empirical analysis, a detailed 
discussion of the data set and the way I build variables that measure officers’ 





Data Set and Variables 
“If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.”  
          Sir William Thomson (1824-1907) 
With some rare exceptions (e.g. Puell de la Villa, 2012) current studies of the 
Spanish Army are qualitative and do not rely on a heavy use of data and statistics. 
Two reasons can explain the absence of a systematic quantitative approach to the 
Spanish Army during the Republic. First, the Republic is a relatively recent 
historical event that also suffered thirty-six years of obscurantism and 
propagandistic interpretations during Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975). Despite 
the effort of foreign Hispanists like Paul Preston, Stanley Payne or Gabriel Jackson, 
the progress in the study of primary sources of the Republic has been slow and full 
of administrative obstacles. Possibilities for research progressively increased after 
the arrival of democracy in 1978 and the slow opening of Spanish archives, which 
is still far from complete. Second, even when data was available for researchers, 
the task of gathering and preparing the information for its analysis required an 
enormous amount of time that limited the scope or the feasibility of the study. I 
benefit both from the advantages conceded by time and technological progress. 
The archival and bibliographical work patiently gathered by historians in the last 
decades has resulted in an impressive amount of information ready to be used in 
the study of the Republic. Carlos Engel deserves special mention in this aspect. 
His thirty-year work reviewing official bulletins and his bibliography related to 
officers during the Republic is crystallized in a book (Engl, 2008) that constitutes 
the first leg of my data set. For the second leg (the combination of information 
contained in military yearbooks), I have enjoyed the advantages of modern 
researchers’ access to powerful software. As Piketty points out, “advances in 
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computer technology have made it much easier to collect and process large amounts 
of historical data” (2014:20). This is a not a negligible advantage when having to 
process, merge, and manipulate data sets with more than 15,000 observations 
recorded in six or more different military yearbooks. 
In order to test the relationship between military policies, factional interests, and 
officers’ behavior during the 1936 coup, I build a dataset that uses data collected 
by Engel (2008) as well as a new data set that I have collected from the Spanish 
military yearbooks between 1910 and 1936. The dataset gathers information on the 
15,098 officers that were active in the Spanish Army in July 1936.  It contains 
information on their individual characteristics in 1936, the evolution of their careers 
during the Republic, and their proximity to the africanista faction by looking at 
their geographical location between 1910 and 1927. 
Engel (2008) is currently the most complete and exhaustive study of Spanish 
officers’ chosen sides during the military coup and Civil War. Besides the side that 
officers chose, his dataset also provides information on officers’ ranks in July 1936, 
the garrison where they were posted, the cities where the officers were physically 
located at the outbreak of the military coup (when possible), and some relevant 
officersN biographical information about their ups and downs during the conflict. 
His data covers both the Army and the Navy. 
The Spanish military yearbooks were published by the Spanish Ministry of War 
and contain information on officers’ dates of birth, dates of entry in the Army, 
corps, ranks, seniorities in the rank, and positions on the scale. The yearbooks were 
usually published in January and they reflected changes that had occurred during 
the previous year. The 1936 military yearbook was published in late April, so it 
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reflected all the changes in ranks and positions on the scale that occurred between 
January 1935 and April 1, 1936 (i.e. three and a half months before the coup). 
Information on the military yearbooks is merged with Engel’s data using officers’ 
names. Officers’ dates of birth and dates of entry in the Army are also used to 
match officers in the military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 in order to 
determine their evolution on the scale and changes of rank during the Republic. 
Matches between names in 1936 and military yearbooks between 1910 and 1927 
are used to determine officers’ geographical location in that period and their 
proximity to the africanista faction.  
The final sample is formed by the 11,873 active officers in July 1936 that belonged 
to the corps of General Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, Aviation20, 
Transportation (Cuerpo de Tren), Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), and Frontier 
Guards (Carabineros). The 3,078 active officers in July 1936 that are excluded from 
the final sample fall into two categories. The first category is formed by corps in 
which all the officers rebelled: “Sea Companies Corps” (Patrones de Compañía, 
eight officers) and the African Regulars (Oficialidad del Tercio, eight officers after 
excluding those that actually belonged to the Aviation corps). Following Puell de 
la Villa (2012), the second category is formed by those officers belonging to corps 
that are excluded because they lacked the ability to command armed forces or, 
strictly speaking, were not part of the Spanish Army: Quartermaster, Intervención 
(fiscal control of the Army), Medical corps, Pharmacy, Church, Military 
                                     
20 The Aviation corps, the youngest of all corps which was in the process of consolidation, was not 
fully separated from the other corps in the 1936 military yearbook. The yearbook only separates 
the aviation officers from the rank of “alférez” (see table 1). Higher rank aviation officers were 
included in other corps like Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery or Engineers (see Cebreiros, 1931: 250 for 
the historical origin of this “dual scale” in the Aviation corps). Engel (2008) provides information 
to identify the officers belonging to the Aviation corps with a rank higher than alférez, so I use his 
data to find which officers in the 1936 yearbook were aviators. 
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Veterinarians, Military Offices, Music directors, Horseback riding teachers, 
Topographic Brigade, Infantry Moorish Officers, and Moorish Cavalry (3,062 
officers). 
VI.1. Officers’ Affiliation at the Outbreak of the Civil War  
There is not precise and consensual data for the side that officers chose at the 
outbreak of the Civil War. In his study, Engel restricted his data to active officers 
in July 1936.21 He used the bulletins from the Spanish Ministry of War (Diario 
Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra, DOMG) during the War period (1936-1939) 
and Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE, equivalent to the American Congressional 
Record) between 1936 and 194522 to find dispositions and information concerning 
officers in the Army during the Civil War and the post war (promotions, trials, 
death penalties, expulsions, imprisonments…) to determine the side they chose.  
Officers that were put in jail, sentenced to death or expelled from the Army by the 
republican government are labelled as rebels. Officers that were in the Army in 
July 1936 and remained in the military after the rebel victory in 1939 without any 
penalty or punishment in their records are considered rebels too. Following the 
same logic, officers punished on rebel’s official bulletins or those that only appear 
                                     
21 After eliminating some repetitions and excluding the corps of Handicapped and the Moorish 
troops, my data show that the 1936 military yearbook contained 15,258 active officers in April 
1936. 160 (1.05%) of those officers were excluded due to inconsistencies with the data provided by 
the military yearbook (e.g. typos in dates of birth) leaving us with 15,098 active officers. 14,893 of 
those officers (98.64%) could be matched with Engel’s data, so 205 officials remained unmatched. 
Consulting the Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra (DOMG, bulletins of the Minister of the 
War) between April and July 1936, I was able to determine that among those 205 unmatched 
officials, 66 had retired, 9 passed to the reserve, and 25 passed away between April 1 and July 17 
1936.  This leaves us with 105 officers (0.7% of the 14,893 that constitute the population of 
reference) for whom either Engel did not provide data or I was unable to find the documental 
evidence proving that they were not active in July 1936.  
22 During the war, there were two Boletín Oficial del Estado: one issued by the military junta 
controlling the rebel area and another issued by the republican government in Madrid.  
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as part of the Republican Army until 1939 are labelled as “republicans” (i.e. loyal 
to the republican regime).  
Besides these clear cases, there are other examples in which officers’ classifications 
demand greater subjective judgment. First, Engel identifies the “republican 
geographical loyal officers”, namely officers that “stayed loyal to the republic for 
geographical reasons” (Navajas, 2011: 137). Rather than be influenced by their 
convictions or preferences, officers in this category probably stayed in the 
republican ranks during the conflict because they happened to be in republican 
controlled areas when the coup broke out. When officers stayed on the republican 
side during the Civil war but were integrated into Franco’s army without 
punishment or sanction when the conflict ended, they were labeled “republican 
geographical loyal officers”. There were also cases of “rebel geographical loyal 
officers” that, after fighting on the rebel side, were obliged to abandon Franco’s 
troops due to their “ambiguous” behavior or because their loyalty to the rebel cause 
was doubted. Given that republican geographical loyal officers did not have a 
strong identification with the Republic (otherwise they would have been repressed 
during Franco’s purge after the war) they are classified as rebels in my final sample. 
The reverse reasoning applies to geographical loyal officers on the rebel side, so 
they are labeled as “republicans”. The final sample contains 536 geographical loyal 
officers in total (4.5% of total officers). A second problematic category of officers 
is formed by those officers that were affected by the “Varela law”23. The law 
imposed retirement from the Army on those officers “whose lack of aptitude put 
                                     
23 Law of July 12, 1940 that updated, completed, and reenacted the Decree 100 of December 15, 
1936 (see next footnote). 
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their subordinates at risk because of their indecisiveness or ineptitude.”24 Given the 
impossibility of differentiating between officers affected by the law given their poor 
management skills (therefore not showing any weakness in their adhesion to the 
rebel cause) and those for whom weak loyalty resulted in hesitant command of the 
troops, all these officers in the sample are labeled as “rebels”. 61 officers (0.5% of 
the final sample) were affected by the Varela law.  
VI.2. Promotions during the Second Spanish Republic  
One important consequence of Azaña’s military reforms was the loss of position or 
demotions for some officers after revising some previous promotions based on 
combat merit or election. In order to account for officers’ professional evolution 
during the Republic and identify those that lost with the revision of promotions, I 
create a variable that accounts for officers’ changes of position on the scale and 
effective rank promotions or demotions between 1931 and 1936. 
The information in Spanish military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 is used to 
measure officers’ changes on the rank scale. First, given officer i’s rank r and corps 





Where Positioni,t,r,c is officer i’s position on the scale of rank r and corps c according 
to the military yearbook of year t. It is useful to keep in mind that military 
yearbooks in t reflect the changes on the scales and ranks that occurred during t-
1.  Total_officerst,r,c is the total number of officers that appear on the scale for rank 
                                     
24 Decree 100, BOE number 57, December 15, 1936. 
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r of corps c in the military yearbook of t. Note that those officers with a higher 
position on the scale (i.e. those closer to being promoted) have a lower RP. The 
officer in the last position of the scale has a RP equal to 1 whereas the first officer 
on the scale has a RP equal to 1/Total_officerst,r,c. 
Officers’ RP are computed for every year between 1931 and 1936. Change of 
position on the scale between t-1 and t is calculated as follows:  































Where ∆ r= change in rank between military yearbook of t and military yearbook 
of t-1 ( ∆ r = 1 if the officer is promoted one rank, ∆ r = -1 if the officer is demoted 
one rank,  ∆ r = 2 if the officer is promoted two ranks, etc.). 
If 0 < ∆ Positioni,t,r,c< 1, officer i did not change his rank in t-1 but improved his 
RP in the scale with respect to t-2. If 1 < ∆ Positioni,t,r,c< 2, officer i was promoted 
one rank in t-1. When -1 < ∆ Positioni,t,r,c< 0, officer i did not change his rank in 
t-1 but worsened his RP with respect to t-2. If -2 < ∆ Positioni,t,r,c < -1, officer i 
was demoted one rank in the year t-1.25  
The expression to compute ∆ Positioni,t,r,c can be better understood through an 
example. In 1931, Infantry colonel José Moscardó Ituarte held the 129th position 
                                     
25 The sample does not contain any case of one officer being promoted or demoted more than 2 
ranks over two consecutive years. 
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among the 177 officers that formed the scale for Infantry colonels. Therefore, 
Moscardó’s RP in 1931 was 0.729 (=129/177). In 1932 the revision of promotions 
under the Republic resulted in officer Moscardó’s demotion to the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel. He occupied the 14th position out of 160 Infantry Lieutenant 
Colonels. This implied a change in position between 1931 and 1932 equal to -1.271 
(= -1-(1-0.729)). The (1-0.729) reflects the “fall” down the Infantry Colonel scale. 
The “-1” (Moscardó’s ∆ r between 1931 and 1932) reflects the punishment or 
economic and psychological costs of being demoted one rank. In 1933 Moscardó 
regained the rank of Colonel reaching the 67th position out of the 79 colonels on 
the scale. The resulting change in position between 1932 and 1933 equaled 
1+0.0875. The 0.0875 reflect his progress in the Infantry Lieutenant Colonel scale 
(note that Moscardó’s RP in 1932 was 14/160=0.0875). The “+1” (Moscardó’s ∆
r between 1932 and 1933) represents Moscardó’s promotion to the rank of Colonel. 
The RP in the 1933 scale for Infantry colonels was 0.848. In 1934, Moscardó 
maintained his rank of colonel and progressed to the 49th position in a year in which 
71 officers formed the scale for Infantry colonels. Therefore Moscardó’s RP in 1934 
was 0.69. This implied a change in position in 1934 equal to 0.158 (=0.848-0.69). 
I create the variable ∆ Positioni,1931-1936 to measure changes in relative officers’ 
positions during the Republic. ∆ Positioni,1931-1936 measures officer i’s change in 
relative position during the Republic by aggregating the changes that officers 
experienced in each year between 1931 and 1936: 






VI.3. Africanista Officers  
In his study of the africanista group, Mas points out that “the majority of the 
[africanista] group was formed by officers who stayed many years in Morocco, Ifni 
or Sahara posted in La Legión [Spanish Foreign Legion], African regular Army, 
Marksmen, Nomads, Mehal-las, Police, Intervention Corps, and so on”26 (1988: 8-
9). Balfour and La Porte defend a similar idea in their discussion of the military 
Africanist culture “in the course of the intermittent wars with the tribes of northern 
Morocco between 1909 and 1927, a new military culture called Africanismo was 
forged among an elite of colonial officers” (2000: 309). This elite excluded some of 
the officers posted to Africa “who had not volunteered to fight in, but had been 
posted to Morocco, and for whom military intervention there had little ideological 
or political appeal” (Balfour and La Porte 2000: 313). In the same line but more 
generally, Navajas affirms that “regular and Foreign Legion forces were the core of 
military africanism” (2011:66). In all these definitions, the africanista faction is 
restricted to a subset of those officers posted to Africa between 1909 and 1927. 
Following these definitions of the africanista military factions, Military yearbooks 
between 1911 and 1927 are used to construct a variable called “Years Core Africa 
(1910-1927)” that measures the number of years that active officers had spent 
posted to the special forces of the Spanish Protectorate between 1911 and 1927 as 
of July 1936. The special units permanently posted to the Spanish Protectorate in 
Africa comprised the Spanish Foreign Legion (Tercio de Extranjeros), the Native 
                                     
26 “La mayoría del grupo en cuestión lo forman los Cuadros de Mando que permanecieron largos 
años en Marruecos, Ifni o Sahara o destinados en La Legión, Regulares, Tiradores, Nómadas, Mehal-
las, Policía, Intervenciones, etc., es decir, en lo que genéricamente se llamaron Fuerzas Especiales”. 
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Regulars (Grupos de Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas), the Mehal.las, the Harkas, the 
Native Police (Policía Indígena), and African Military Intervention.27 
VI.4. Other Officers’ Individual Covariates  
Information in the 1936 Spanish military yearbook is also a source for information 
on officers’ corps, ranks, and tenure (computed as the difference between 1936 and 
an officer’s year of entry in the Army). Engel provides additional information on 
each officer’s military division28, garrison in July 1936, the area where the officer 
was during the coup (republican or rebel-controlled area), and the city where the 
officer was when the coup broke out in July 1936. Information on officers’ garrisons 
and their locations is used to create a dummy “Leader” that takes the value 1 for 
the officer(s) in the garrison holding the highest rank and 0 for the rest. 
The dummy variable “Assault Guard” takes the value 1 for those officers recruited 
from different corps to be part of the Assault Guard and 0 for the others.  
Finally, the dummy variable “Worse Prospects after 1931” identifies those officers 
with worse professional prospects after the rank of lieutenant general was 
                                     
27 Despite the fact that almost the entire troops of the Mehal.las, Harkas or Native Regulars were 
formed by African soldiers, the great majority of their officers were Spanish. 
28 Spain was divided in eight military divisions plus Balearic Islands and Canary Islands. The first 
divisions included the provinces of Madrid, Toledo, Cuenca, Ciudad Real, Badajoz, and 
Guadalajara; the second, Seville, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Malaga, Granada, Almeria, and Jaen; 
the third, Valencia, Alicante, Albacete, Murcia, and Castellon; the fourth, Barcelona, Tarragona, 
Lerida, and Gerona; the fifth, Zaragoza, Huesca, Soria, and Teruel; the sixth, Burgos, Navarre, 
Guipúzcoa, and Logroño; the seventh, Valladolid, Zamora, Salamanca, Avila, Segovia, and Caceres; 
finally, the eight division comprised Coruña, Lugo, Orense, Pontevedra, Oviedo, and Leon. The 
African territories formed a separate military administrative entity. I divide the Spanish possessions 
in Africa in seven regions: Western district (formed by Tetuán, Xauen, Ceuta, Larache, Arcila, and 
Alcazar), Eastern district (Melilla, Chafarinas Islands, Rock of Velez, and Rock of Alhucemas), Rif, 
Ifni, Juby Cape, Río de Oro, and Gulf of Guinea.  The thirteen officers in the Gulf of Guinea are 
excluded from the later empirical analysis because all rebelled. 
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eliminated in 1931. It takes the value 1 for officers that held the rank of Major or 
higher in 1931 and 0 for the rest. 
VI.5. Summary Statistics  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the whole country. On average, officers 
had been in the Army for twenty two years29 and 92% of them were posted to a 
garrison in July 1936. The remaining 8% were sick, injured, arrested or awaiting a 
destination. 8% of officers were leaders or held the highest rank in the garrison 
when the coup took place.30 When looking at the distribution by corps, Infantry 
was the largest with 41% of officers in the sample. Artillery (18%), Engineers (8%), 
and Cavalry (8%) followed. One third of the sample had been posted to Africa for 
at least one year. On average, officers spent a quarter of a year posted to special 
African units.31 As it relates to professional evolution during the Republic, on 
average officers improved their relative position by 0.85 between 1931 and 1936. 
That is, the average official had a positive evolution in the scale within his rank 
(because 0.85>0) but did not promote to a higher rank between 1931 and 1936 
(because 0.85<1). Finally, 12% of officers in the sample held a rank of Major or 
higher in 1931 and thus had worse career prospects when the rank of Lieutenant 
General was eliminated in 1931.  
Table 4 presents summary statistics for officers in rebel-controlled and republican-
controlled areas separately (see Figure 1 for the geographical limits of each area). 
On average, areas under republican control had more experienced officers (average 
                                     
29 The date of entry in the Army marks the moment in which the officer entered the military 
academy. Studies in the academy usually took five years and then the officer passed to the scale 
(Ruiz Vidondo, 2004). This explains the minimum value of 5 for the variable “tenure” in the sample. 
30 In July 1936 some garrisons were awaiting the designation of a new leader. 
31 If we focus on the 1335 officers that spent at least one year posted to special African units, the 
average stay in Africa was slightly above two years. 
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tenure of 23 years against 21.5) with a higher ranks.32 Rebel areas had more officers 
posted than republican areas, where 9.2% of officers were awaiting their 
destinations or were not ready to serve. When looking at the composition by corps, 
General Staff, Engineers, Aviation, Frontier Guards, Transportation, and Civil 
Guard were more present in republican areas, whereas officers from Artillery, 
Infantry and Cavalry were relatively more numerous in areas under rebel control. 
Officers in rebel-controlled areas spent more years posted to special African units 
than officers in areas under republican control.33 Finally, a greater proportion of 
officers in republican areas were negatively affected by the elimination of the rank 
of Lieutenant General. Nevertheless, officers in republican-controlled areas also 
benefited from greater improvements in their relative positions between 1931 and 
1936. 
The most relevant statistic relates to the split of the Army between rebel and 
republican officers. Despite the fact that distribution of officers between areas 
under republican and rebel control was relatively equal at the time of the coup 
(48.22% and 51.78% respectively, see Table 5), 80% of officers in the sample 
supported the coup against the Republic. This result is at odds with any theory 
that emphasizes the importance of factions and conflicts of interests within the 
Army but obscures an important difference in the distribution of affiliations shown 
in Table 5: 93.11% of officers in rebel-controlled areas aligned with the rebel Army, 
whereas in areas under republican control the distribution was more even (35% 
officers remained loyal to the Republic and 65% rebelled). The literature does not 
provide an explanation for this difference. Here it is argued that the different 
                                     
32 The nine ranks shown at Table 1 are given a number that increases with their position in the 
military hierarchy. 
33 When focusing only on officers that spent at least one year in special African units, officers in 
rebel areas spent 2.16 years against 2 years for officers in republican-controlled areas. 
59 
 
behavior of officers in each area was due to authorities’ different responses in each 
area. 
In a law passed on July 18 (the day after the coup started in the Spanish African 
territories), the republican government in Madrid stated that “all the troops in 
which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are 
discharged”34. Manuel Azaña, President of the Republic when the coup broke out, 
commented on the intentions and effects of the law: 
“Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed 
all soldiers from obeisance to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not 
followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important 
towns under republican command (Madrid, Barcelona, Cartagena, Valencia, 
and so on). Soldiers abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back 
home”35 (2011: 55-6, translation is mine). 
In other words, officers in areas under republican authority had some freedom and 
time to decide their side in the conflict. 
The situation in rebel-controlled areas was very different. Since the early stages of 
the planning of the coup, the putschists sought to establish strong discipline and 
meticulous repression of opposing forces. While organizing the coup in April 1936, 
General Emilio Mola Vidal issued a series of secret orders that called for extreme 
violence to shock and intimidate loyal republican opposition. In another secret 
instruction dictated on the 20th of June (three days after the coup broke out in 
                                     
34 Gaceta de Madrid, n. 201,  July 19, 1936, p. 201. 
35 “El gobierno desligó de la obediencia a sus jefes a todos los soldados, pensando dejar sin tropas a 
los directores del movimiento. Este decreto, naturalmente, no fue obedecido en las ciudades ya 
dominadas por los militares, pero sí en las importantes plazas en poder del gobierno (Madrid, 
Barcelona, Cartagena, Valencia, etcétera). Los soldados abandonaron los cuarteles y casi todos se 
marcharon a sus casas”. 
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Africa), Mola declared that “the timid and the hesitant should be warned that he 
who is not with us is against us and will be treated as an enemy” (Preston, 
2012:132).36 The prescription was rapidly put into practice in the areas that fell 
under rebel control after the first hours or days of the coup. On the night of 17 
July, only hours after the coup started, the rebels shot 225 soldiers and civilians in 
Morocco (Preston, 2012:133). In Cádiz, the first region of southern Andalucía that 
rebels controlled one day after the coup started, General Queipo del Llano issued 
an edict on 18 July decreeing that anyone who opposed the rising would be shot. 
In the northern mainland under rebel control, General Mola followed a similar logic 
when instructing the authorities in the area: “It is necessary to spread terror. We 
have to create the impression of mastery, eliminating without scruples or hesitation 
all those who do not think as we do” (Preston, 2012: 179). Officers in rebel 
controlled areas could not escape the climate of terror, coercion, and strict 
discipline that the putschists created (see, for example, Navajas, 2011: 163-197).  
The dynamics of the coup can be summarized in a three-stage sequence. In the first 
stage, the coup against the military republican authorities was attempted by a 
small group of generals and high-ranking officers. In those areas where the coup 
was successful, the second stage involved rebel authorities taking control of the 
areas and imposing their coercive military government; in those areas where the 
coup failed, republican authorities controlled the region and issued the law 
discharging the troops. Finally, in the last stage, officers chose their sides in the 
conflict given their personal preferences and the degree of coercion imposed by 
authorities in the region in the second stage.  
                                     
36 Mola’s instruction was mainly addressed to civil repression, but, as Rivero points out, “it is likely 




Determinants of Officers’ Choice of Sides during the Civil War  
The data set with active officers’ individual information enables us to study the 
impact of republican military reforms on the choices made by officers’ in the Civil 
War. I estimate the relationship between officers’ chosen sides and military reforms 
through the following probit regression:  
ProbRebeli=1=Φ(β0+β1Si+β2Ci+β3Ai+β4 ∆ Pi+β5WPi+β6Xi)+εi 
Where: 
Si= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if officer i was in an area under rebel 
control on July 22 and 0 otherwise.  
Ci= Officer i’s corps. 
Ai= Number of years that officer i spent posted to a special unit of the Spanish 
Army in Africa between 1910 and 1927. 
∆ Pi= Change of position for officer i between 1931 and 1936. 
WPi= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if officer i had the rank of Major or 
higher in 1931 and 0 otherwise. 
Xi= Officer i’s additional covariates (rank, tenure, military division, and dummy 
for being posted or leader of the garrison). 
The study of the dynamics of the coup in §VI.5 shows that the environment in 
which (most) officers chose their sides in republican-controlled areas was very 
different from the way they chose their sides in rebel-controlled ones. After 
estimating the main regression for the whole country, I run the same regression for 
each area separately (§VII.1) to study the determinants of officers’ decisions in 
each area. My results show a significant relationship between officers’ chosen sides 
and the impact of military reforms for those officers that were in republican-
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controlled areas. Moreover, one of the ideological explanations traditionally 
advanced in Spanish history (that the Africanista faction massively joined the coup 
due to its conservatism) is not supported by my evidence. The results suggest that 
the channel that explains the greater involvement of some africanista officers in 
the rebellion against the Republic is the negative impact of republican reforms 
implemented between 1931 and 1933 on africanista officers’ careers (§VII.2). 
Finally, I show that the main results do not substantially change after addressing 
potential problems of endogeneity (§VII.3) and using alternative definitions for the 
variables and alternative functional forms for regressions (§VII.4).  
VII.1. Results for the Whole Country and Geographic Areas under Republican and 
Rebel Control  
Table 6 presents probit marginal effects for the main regression of the whole 
country. Results indicate that officers with higher ranks and lower tenures were 
more likely to revolt. This result is at odds with Puell de la VillaNs statement that 
“the greater the rank, and therefore the familiar charges, the greater the resistance 
to support the conspiracy”37 (2012:92). The result is still consistent with rational 
economic behavior: risk aversion motives meant lower ranking officers were less 
likely to revolt due to their lower ability to cope with an eventual failure of the 
coup. That lower ability to cope with the negative consequences that would result 
if the coup ultimately failed could be explained by the fact that, in general, officers 
with lower ranks had less wealth than high-ranking officers.  
When looking at the results by corps, the coefficients only provide partial 
confirmation for the hypothesis derived in section 3.2.1 about corps loyalty to the 
                                     
37 “(...) cuanto mayor era el empleo, y por tanto las cargas familiares, mayor fue la resistencia a 
embarcarse en la conspiración” 
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Republic: Infantry and Cavalry were not significantly more likely to revolt than 
Artillery (the reference variable for corps in the regression) or Engineers. Aviation 
has the expected negative sign.  Aviators were 14.6 points less likely to revolt than 
Artillerymen, Engineers or Cavalrymen. Frontier Guards (police in charge of the 
frontiers and fighting fraud and smuggling) were also significantly less likely to 
revolt against the Republic. Some scholars have argued that officers from General 
Staff corps were more involved in conspiracies against the Republic (Navajas, 2011: 
96). The results do not support that claim. One result that is often mentioned and 
that is confirmed by the data is the greater loyalty of officers in the Assault Guard 
to the republican government. Members of these units were on average 22 points 
less likely to revolt. 
In line with the discussion in section 3, officers in rebel-controlled areas are found 
to be 21 points more likely to rebel against the Republic. Results are also supportive 
of the idea that officers were responsive to changes in their career prospects. The 
coefficient for “Change Position 1931-1936” indicates that for each rank that 
officers advanced between 1931 and 1936, the likelihood to rebel in 1936 decreases 
1.5 points.  
Results for the whole country provide weak support for significant relationships 
between officers’ chosen sides and republican military policies or factions in the 
Army. Given the different conditions that officers faced in rebel and republican 
areas, separate results for each area are shown in Tables 6 and 7. The different 
dynamics of the coup in the two territories is confirmed. In areas under rebel 
control (Table 7), only tenure and some corps variables have a significant impact 
on officers’ affiliation.  As in the regression for the whole country, the republic 
could count on greater loyalty from Infantry, Aviation, Frontier Guards, and 
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Assault Guards. Transportation and Civil Guard were also (weakly) less likely to 
support the coup. The impact of Azaña’s military policies did not have any 
significant influence on officers’ behavior in rebel-controlled areas. Years in Core 
Africa, however, shows a surprising (even if relatively small) negative and 
significant sign indicating that africanista officers were 0.8 points less likely to 
revolt in the rebel areas, going against the traditional idea that africanista officers 
were more likely to join the coup.   
The significant relationship between republican military policies and officers’ 
chosen sides found for the whole country are mainly driven by officers’ behavior in 
republican-controlled areas. Table 8 shows the results for officers in areas under 
republican control:  Aviation and Assault Guards remained significantly more loyal 
to the Republic, but Artillerymen and Engineers are not found to be more loyal 
than Infantrymen or Cavalrymen. In contrast to rebel-controlled areas, in areas 
under republican control Azaña’s military reforms had a significant impact on 
officers’ chosen sides. Change of position between 1931 and 1936 has a negative 
sign, implying that officers with a negative change of position (demoted officers) 
were more likely to revolt: for each rank that officers lost (advanced) between 1931 
and 1936, the probability to revolt increased (decreased) by 3.1 points. Moreover, 
the elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General in 1931 also had a significant 
impact in the expected direction: those officers that in 1931 held a rank of Major 
or higher and had worse career prospects after the top rank in the Army was 
eliminated were 6 points more likely to revolt.  
In summary, the results suggest that Azaña’s reforms had a significant impact in 
republican-controlled areas.  In those areas, officers were subject to less coercion 
and had greater freedom to reveal their preferences when choosing their side in the 
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conflict: factions or officers that benefitted from the reforms (e.g. those that, like 
peninsulares, were less affected by the revisions of promotions and could keep their 
position on the scale or improve it when others were demoted) were more likely to 
support the Republic in 1936. Those officers hit by demotions in 1931 or 1933 and 
those that lost with the elimination of Lieutenant Generals were more likely to 
revolt. 
The literature usually emphasizes that officers affected by Azaña’s reforms “were 
prominent in both sides during the Civil War”38 (Alpert, 2006: 140; translation is 
mine). This conventional wisdom neglects the importance that revisions of 
promotions had in determining officers’ affiliations in July 1936. After controlling 
for other variables, the results in Table 8 suggest a different story. Officers cared 
about their evolution on the scale and the promotions they received. By hindering 
officers’ progress on the scale or leading to demotions of rank, early republican 
military reforms increased the likelihood of revolt for those officers whose 
promotions were revised and then cancelled.  
VII.2. Africanista Officers and the Revision of Promotions  
The results confirm the influence that changes on the scale had on officers’ 
affiliations but do not provide any direct link between the africanista faction and 
officers’ affiliations during the coup. Indeed, the variable “Years in Core Africa 
(1910-1927)” is not significant for the whole country or republican-controlled area. 
The small negative coefficient in areas under rebel control does not have a ready 
interpretation. Contrary to the intuition in the literature, results suggest that 
spending more years posted to a special African unit between 1910 and 1927 is not 
                                     
38 “Muchos de estos 500 militares [afectados por las revisiones de las promociones] figurarían 
relevantemente en ambos bandos durante la guerra civil” 
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associated with greater probability to rebel in 1936. The closing of the General 
Military Academy directed by General Franco or the alleged anti-republican 
africanista culture that are often invoked to explain africanistas’ aversion towards 
Azaña and his republican government (see for example Balfour and La Porte, 2000) 
did not increase africanistas’ propensity to revolt when compared to peninsular 
peers. This surprising result goes against the widespread idea that something in 
the military culture or ideology of africanistas made them more likely to join the 
rebel lines at the outbreak of the coup. 
However, the importance of officers’ change of position offers an indirect link 
between Azaña’s reforms and africanista officers’ attitude vis-à-vis the Republic 
through factional economic and professional interests rather than culture or 
ideology. Table 9 runs a regression to determine the factors that influenced officers’ 
change of position between 1931 and 1933 (years of republican-socialist government 
with Azaña as Minister of the War) and Table 10 performs a similar regression for 
the 1934-1936 period in which Spain had a series of center-right governments 
opposed to the 1931-1933 coalition and the Frente Popular that ruled in July 
1936.39 The dependent variable in Table 9 is the sum of ∆ Positioni,t,r,c for the years 
1932, 1933, and 1934. The dependent variable in Table 10 adds ∆ Positioni,t,r,c for 
the years 1935 and 1936. 
The negative coefficient for “Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)” in Table 9 shows 
that between 1931 and 1933, officers who spent more years in African special units 
progressed less on the scale. Table 10 shows that this effect does not exist for the 
                                     
39 Given that the variable tenure measures the time passed between officer’s year of entry in the 




1934-1935 period and is even reversed: when center-right governments ruled, 
africanista officers had greater positive changes in their position. For each year 
posted to a special African unit, relative position between 1934 and 1936 improved 
by 0.059. In other words, the results suggest that the africanista faction did 
significantly worse during Azaña’s term as Minister of the War.  
Azaña’s main measure affecting officers’ ranks and positions on the scale was the 
revision of promotions in 1931 and 1933. Africanista officers’ poor performance 
during Azaña’s mandate could be in part due to the revisions of promotions under 
Azaña. Table 11 explores this possibility by showing the average marginal effects 
of a probit regression in which the dependent variable (“Lost position in 1931 or 
1933”) identifies the officers affected by the revision of promotions. “Lost position” 
takes the value 1 when the officer lost a rank or worsened his absolute position on 
the scale in 1931 or 1933 and 0 otherwise. Tenure, rank and corps in 1931 and 
years posted to a special African unit are used as independent variables to explain 
the likelihood of being affected by Azaña’s revisions of promotions. Results show 
that for each year posted to special African units, the probability of being affected 
by the revisions of promotions increased by 0.017. Officers posted more years to 
African special units were more likely to suffer a loss of position or demotion in 
1931 or 1933 after promotions by combat merit and selection were revised. 
Appendix C at the end shows that almost one third of africanistas’ worse 
professional progress between 1931 and 1933 can be explained by the revisions of 
promotions. The remaining two thirds can be attributed to other unexplained 
discriminations against the africanista faction. 
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In his study of the Spanish Army, Navajas claims that the importance of the 
africanista faction and its impact on the Spanish Army in 1936 has been overstated 
for three reasons: the African wars had finished well before 1936 (in 1927), some 
africanista officers had also belonged to the peninsular faction and only later 
became africanistas, and there were no significant ideological differences between 
peninsulares and africanistas (2011: 110). The importance of self-interest in 
determining officers’ support to africanista demands for promotions by combat 
merit has already been explained and the non-significance of the variable “Years 
Core Africa (1910-1927)” to determine officers’ sides in July 1936 is consistent with 
peninsulares and africanistas sharing a similar culture and ideology. Concerning 
the importance of African wars before 1927 and africanista officers’ incentive to 
rebel in 1936, results in this and previous sections suggest a different conclusion. 
Combat against Moroccan tribes led to promotions by combat merit during Primo 
de Rivera’s dictatorship that were revised (and often cancelled) by Azaña between 
1931 and 1933. Africanista officers were significantly hit by these revisions and the 
resulting demotions. Section 5.1 shows that there was a negative relationship 
between changes in rank or positions on the scale and the probability to revolt. 
Therefore, africanista officers had greater incentives to rebel against Azaña’s 
Popular Front than peninsulares. Rather than guided by ideology or any particular 
military culture, the involvement of africanista officers in the 1936 military coup 
can be linked to the negative impact that revision of promotions in 1931 and 1933 
had on their careers, professional prospects, and economic well-beings.  
VII.3. Addressing Problems with Africanista Culture  
The impact that revising promotions had on africanista officers could have been 
deliberate: if the africanista faction shared some unobservable ideological 
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characteristic that made them politically dangerous for the Republic and the 
republican-socialist coalition in power between 1931 and 1933, Azaña’s reforms 
could have targeted africanista officers to reduce their importance in the Army by 
revising their promotions and lowering their positions on the scale and their ranks. 
In that case, the positive relationship found between change of position in 1931 
and 1936 could be driven by Azaña’s deliberate attempt to target political rivals 
in the Army between 1931 and 1933. Balfour and La Porte make a similar point: 
“The vast majority of Africanist officers, irrespective of their tendency, joined 
the uprising of July 1936. Above and beyond their shared military culture, they 
were united around a common political culture characterized by 
authoritarianism and a right-wing mythology of patriotism (...).” (2000: 319) 
In order to isolate the effect of changes of position and rank from other 
unobservable ideological variables, I use two alternative measures of an officer’s 
change of position in the Republic: change of position between 1934 and 193640 and 
change of position between 1934 and 1936 excluding the sergeants promoted to the 
rank of alférez by the law of December 5, 1935.  
Using change of position between 1934 and 1936 has one important advantage with 
respect to the dummy variable for being demoted in 1931 or 1933. Between January 
1934 and December 1935, the Republic was ruled by a series of center-right 
governments that held opposite views in comparison to the previous republican-
socialist coalition or the government of the Frente Popular that followed in 1936. 
There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence pointing to the reversal in military 
policy between January 1934 and December 1935 with respect to Azaña’s previous 
mandate. Cardona summarizes Hidalgo’s policy as head of the Minister of War 
                                     










between January and November 1934 as an attempt to detract from Azaña’s 
reforms and benefit some of the former minister’s enemies (1983: 198). Moreover, 
José María Gil Robles, the main figure of the leading republican conservative party 
and the Minister of the War between May and December 1935, described his term 
in the Ministry as follows: “I relieved many officers of their post, I deprived of 
command many officers that did not deserve such responsibility and, consequently, 
I purged the Army of clearly undesirable elements” (1968: 238). The “clearly 
undesirable elements” could have been Azaña’s loyal officers41, even if Gil Robles 
adds that “not a single sanctioned officer could point to arbitrariness or present 
himself as the victim of an ideological prosecution”42. 
It is possible that Gil Robles’ claim is true and promotion and changes of position 
between January 1934 and December 1935 were made through the channels of 
seniority and study that the law of May 1932 established (see section 3.2.2). 
However, if there was any bias at all, it was likely in favor of sectors of the Army 
that were contrary to Azaña’s party and were therefore more likely to rebel against 
the government of the Popular Front in July 1936. If anything, one should expect 
a positive bias in the effect that the coefficient of change of position between 1934 
and 1936 had over the probability to revolt in 1936.   
Results in Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 12 show that changes of position between 
1934 and 1936 have a negative influence on the likelihood to revolt in the whole 
country (Column 1) and republican-controlled areas (Column 3). In other words, 
                                     
41 That’s Cardona’s interpretation when he states that under Gil Robles’ mandate “notorious 
africanista and peninsular conspirators replaced liberals and republicans” (Cardona, 1983: 212).  
42 “Ordené la disponibilidad de numerosos jefes y oficiales, privé del mando a muchos que no lo 
merecían y depuré, en consecuencia, de elementos claramente indeseables a gran parte del Ejército. 
Ni uno solo de ellos pudo, sin embargo, alegar arbitrariedad en la medida sancionadora, ni 
presentarse como víctima de una persecución por motivos ideológicos.” 
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those officers with greater (lower) increase in their position of the scale or rank 
were less (more) likely to revolt in republican-controlled areas. This confirms our 
previous finding that negative shocks on scale position or rank increased the 
likelihood of revolt. The coefficient for promotions between 1934 and 1936 is equal 
to zero in rebel-controlled areas (Column 5). 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 12 take one further step in isolating the impact of 
change of position between 1934 and 1936 from unobservable “ideological” 
variables. In a law passed in December 1935, many sergeants were promoted to the 
rank of Alférez and appear in the 1936 military yearbook as “Alférez (law December 
5, 1935)”43. Some scholars argue that non-commissioned officers like sergeants had 
a different mentality than commissioned officers (Puell de la Villa, 2012: 96). 
Furthermore, Azaña’s policies greatly improved the situation of non-commissioned 
officers between 1931 and 1933 (Cardona, 1983: 200). It is possible then that those 
sergeants promoted to alférez in December 1935 shared some ideological bias in 
favor of the Republic or Azaña’s Frente Popular in July 1936.  In order to avoid 
this potential bias, I run a regression with changes of position between 1934 and 
1936 that excludes all the sergeants promoted to the rank of “Alférez (Law of 
December 1935)”. Results are shown in Table 12 for the whole country (Column 
2), areas under republican control (Column 4), and areas under rebel control 
(Column 6). Results are not substantially different. The positive relationship 
between improving the position on the scale and remaining loyal to the Republic 
in July 1936 still exists and is significant for areas under republican control.  
                                     
43 The sample contains 2166 officers (18.72%) with the rank “alférez (ley de 5 de diciembre de 1935)”.  
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VII.4. Robustness Checks  
By using a probit model, our main specification assumes that errors are normally 
distributed. Other possibilities when having a binary dependent variable are the 
logit model (which assumes that errors follow a logistic distribution) and Ordinary 
Last Squares (Linear Probability Model, LPM). Table 13 compares previous results 
for probit average marginal effects for the entire country, republican-controlled 
areas, and rebel-controlled areas areas (Columns 1, 4, and 7 respectively) with 
results using a Linear Probability Model (Columns 2, 5, and 8) or a Logit model 
(for which average marginal effects are shown in Columns 3, 6, and 9). Signs, 
significance and magnitude are essentially the same across specifications. 
Table 14 explores alternative definitions or specifications for variables used in 
baseline regressions for the whole country (reproduced in Column 1), republican-
controlled areas (Column 5), and rebel-controlled areas (Column 9). Column 2, 6, 
and 10 show the results for regressions with officers that Engel (2008) attributes a 
“pure label” (either clearly republican or clearly rebel). The 536 geographical loyal 
officers (both republican and rebel) are eliminated from the sample. Additionally, 
36 officers for whom Engel expressed some doubts when classifying them as rebels 
or republicans and the 61 officers affected by Varela’s law are also excluded. The 
final subsample contains 11,187 officers. Results do not show any relevant change 
in the statistical significance, sign or magnitude of the coefficients for the whole 
country (Column 2) or areas under republican and rebel control taken separately 
(Columns 6 and 10 respectively). 
An alternative definition for the variable ∆ Positioni,t,r,c  is explored in Columns 3, 
7, and 11 of Table 14. The variable ∆ Positioni,t,r,c  measures changes in officers’ 
relative positions for two years to account for the change in the rank scale, rank 
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promotions, and rank demotions. The use of officers’ relative positions might be 
problematic given the important reductions in the size of the scale of the Army 
between 1931 and 1932. One of the goals of Azaña’s military reforms was to reduce 
the excess of officers in the Spanish Army. In April 1931, Azaña passed a law 
allowing voluntary retirement from the Army with full pay. The policy was very 
successful in reducing the size of the Spanish Army because in 1932 between 8,000 
and 8,200 officers (out of 20,576) had retired (Alpert, 2008: 99). ∆ Positioni,t,r,c 
reflects the change of RP
i,t,r,c
 between t-1 and t, a discrete time framework. In 
continuous time, ∆ Positioni,t,r,c  for those officers keeping the same rank between 
two consecutive periods is equal to the total differential of RP
i,t,r,c



























  indicates the partial derivative of x with respect to y, and dx stands for 
change in variable x. 
The previous result shows that dRPi,t,r,c< 0 if  
dPositioni,t,r,c< RPi,t,r,c∙dTotal˙officerst,r,c              (1) 
In other words, when an officer progresses on the scale while keeping his rank (that 
is, -1 < dPositioni,t,r,c< 0) and there is  a reduction in total officers on the scale 
(dTotal˙officerst,r,c< 0) such that (1) holds, the resulting change in the officer’s 
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relative position will be negative, meaning that he worsened his relative position 
within the scale for rank r in corps c. Using change in relative position implicitly 
assumes that the officer only cares about his relative position on the scale. 
Progresses in absolute positions that still result in a negative change in officers’ 
relative positions are taken as (relative) demotions on the scale. This could be 
exaggerating officers’ computational sophistication when evaluating their changes 
of position on the scale. For those officers that, between t-1 and t, kept the same 
rank and experienced both a negative∆ Positioni,t,r,c and an improvement in their 
absolute position on the scale, I calculate an alternative measure  







∆ Position2i,t,r,c measures the difference between an officer’s relative position in t-1 
and his relative position in t, had the number of officers on the scale in t remained 
unchanged with respect to t-1. ∆ Position2i,t,r,c will be greater than 0 for any officer 
that improved his absolute position on the scale. This assumes that officers’ 
perceived improvements in absolute position as something positive (maybe because 
it advanced them to the top of the scale where they were eligible to be promoted 
to the next rank) independent of the resulting change in their relative position. ∆
Position2i,t,r,c is also applied to those officers that experienced a positive change in 
their relative position despite worsening their relative position on the scale. 
Changes of position for the remaining officers in the sample are calculated 
according to the standard formula for ∆ Positioni,t,r,c in section 4.2. Results show 
that the new computation of change of position does not alter the main finding for 
the coefficient linking changes of position to the probability of rebelling in 1936. 
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The coefficient remains strongly significant for the whole country (Column 3) and 
republican controlled-areas (Column 7), keeping its negative sign and magnitude. 
Columns 4, 8, and 12 in Table 14 measure officers’ proximity to the africanista 
faction with a broader definition than the one used in the baseline specification. 
Rather than considering only officers posted to special units in Africa, the variable 
“Years in Africa (1910-1927)” measures the number of years that each officer spent 
in any garrison or military unit posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927. This 
measurement of “africanism” is broader than the one used in section 5.2 which was 
restricted to officers posted to special African units. Results do not change for the 
whole country (Column 4) or republican-controlled areas (Column 8). The variable 
for years in Africa is not significantly different from zero. In areas under rebel 
control (Column 12) the coefficient passes from being significantly negative to 
being not significantly different from zero.44 
  
                                     
44 There is no a unified theory of class or identity formation. The proxies I use assume that the 
longer the officer stays in Africa, the more exposed he is to the africanista culture and therefore, 
the closer he might be to the africanista faction. A plausible alternative, however, is that 
identification with africanism declines with the time elapsed since the exposure to the africanista 
culture. That is, an officer that only stayed one year –say 1915- posted to an African unit will be 
less identified with the africanista culture in 1936 than an officer that also stayed only for one year 
in Africa but in a more recent date, say 1925. In order to account for this possibility, I weight each 






 ; where r is officer’s discount rate. Then I aggregate the weighted years to find 
the “discounted years” that officers spent in African special units. There is no evidence for the rate 
at which africanista officers discounted the pass of time, so I use r=0.05 which is consistent or 
reasonably close to many of the discount rates found in modern studies (see Frederick et al., 2002). 
The results –available upon request- when using this version of the africanista. I variable do not 
result in any significant change: the coefficient is not significant for the whole country or republican-




The Impact of Hierarchy and Alternative Military Policies  
The analysis of officers’ decisions in the previous chapters leaves some important 
questions unanswered (e.g. how did superiors’ decisions influence subordinates’ 
choices of side?) and opens new ones (how would alternative military policies 
between 1931 and 1933 have changed the distribution of officers supporting the 
rebel or the republican side?). The study of hierarchical relationships and the 
determination of the chain of command in the Army faces important challenges 
given the complexity of the structure of the military and the fact that the military 
coup took place in the summer and many officers were not in their garrisons when 
the coup broke out. §VIII.1 offers some tentative results concerning the effect of 
hierarchy, making the best use of the information contained in my data set and 
the sources it uses. The decision of superior officers appears to be a significant 
determinant of the choices of subordinate officers in republican-controlled areas 
(an officerNs likelihood to rebel significantly increases when the superior officer 
rebels) but the previous results still hold and are fundamentally robust to the 
introduction of hierarchical effects. Coefficients found in §VII.1 are used to estimate 
the change in officers’ choices had the Republic maintained the rank of Lieutenant 
General and not revised and canceled some promotions between 1931 and 1933 
(§VIII.2). Results show that these alternative policies would have resulted in a 
significant increase of 26% in officers supporting the republican government in 
republican-controlled areas, but a modest 2% increase in the republicanNs chances 
of winning the Civil War. 
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VIII.1. Hierarchy  
Until this point, the study of officers’ alignments during the coup has implicitly 
assumed that officers chose their side given their individual characteristics, the 
impact that Azaña’s military policies had on their careers, and the intensity of the 
coercion established by the authorities in the region. A final effect in which a senior 
officers’ side influenced a subordinate’s choice could exist. In other words, after 
learning about the coup and the type of coercion imposed by the authorities, 
officers might have waited for their superior’s decision before taking their side. 
This is particularly plausible in an organization that emphasized the importance 
of hierarchy from the academy onward (Puell de la Villa, 2012: 89) and where one 
of the main demands of officers’ reluctance to join the coup was that “orders to 
move must come through the proper channels from senior commanders” (Payne, 
1971: 99). Salas also points out that “in garrisons where the decision [to rebel] was 
taken by the natural and legitimate leaders, success always accompanied their 
action: the units obeyed the orders and resistances (...) were defeated without 
problem”45 (1973:92). 
The study of hierarchy must confront two difficulties: the precise identification of 
the chain of command in the Spanish Army and determining officers’ geographical 
locations when the coup broke out in July 1936.  
In a complex organization with more than 15,000 active officers, determining the 
exact structure of the Spanish military is an arduous task beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Nevertheless, the army’s chain of command can be roughly approximated 
                                     
45 “En las guarniciones en las que la decisión partió de los jefes militares naturales y legítimos, el 
éxito acompañó invariablemente a su acción: sus unidades obedecieron sus órdenes y las resistencias 
(...) fueron vencidas con pocas dificultades”. 
78 
 
by using the Spanish Army’s own basic division: brigades and regiments (see Figure 
2). The military’s central headquarters were in Madrid. The mainland army was 
divided into eight military divisions with the Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, and 
African territories constituting three additional military regions. At the top of each 
division or military region, a Major General commanded the brigades and the other 
troops posted to the division.  Brigades were led by Brigadier Generals who 
commanded two regiments. Other troops in the division were the Engineers units 
(typically led by a Colonel in the Engineers Headquarters), the Civil Guard (led 
by a General and subdivided into tercios and comandancias), and the Frontier 
Guards (which were divided into comandancias). Two corps (Aviation and Assault 
Guard) were under the authority of central commands in Madrid. There were also 
Catalan special units (mossos and somatenes, and Catalan municipal police forces) 
and Basque ones (e.g. miñones and migueletes). 
The second difficulty arises because, when the military coup broke out in July 
1936, many officers had abandoned their garrisons and were on summer leave. 
Engel (2008) provides information for those officers that were known to be out of 
their garrisons in July 1936. In order to assess the impact of hierarchy, the sample 
is restricted to those officers that were posted to a garrison (10,964 or 92.3% of the 
final sample). After excluding those officers for whom Engel provides information 
indicating that they were not at the garrison when the coup broke out, the final 
sample for the analysis of hierarchy is formed by 10,458 officers (or 95.3% of posted 
officers). The sample contains 791 military units (e.g. regiments, comandancias, or 
headquarters) with a total of 875 leaders (officer holding the highest rank in the 
garrison or the military unit).46  
                                     
46 Some military units (e.g. those in which the leadership was vacant) held many officers that shared 
the highest rank in the unit. 
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The impact of hierarchy on officers’ sided is measured through a dummy variable 
(“Follow”) that takes the value 1 when the leader of the garrison rebelled and 0 
otherwise. For each leader i in a given garrison or military unit, “Follow” takes the 
value 1 if the leader of the unit above him (in other words, i’s immediate superior) 
rebelled and 0 otherwise.47 Given that Madrid, Catalan and Basque governments 
did not rebel, it is assumed that the ultimate authority for military units controlled 
by those governments remained loyal to the Republic.  
Results introducing the impact of hierarchy in the main specification are shown in 
Table 15. The sample for regressions shown in Table 15 is restricted to posted 
officers that were in their garrisons when the coup broke out.48 For the whole 
country (Column 1), the probability of rebelling increases by 7.4 points when the 
leader of the garrison or the officer commanding the superior military unit rebelled.  
Columns 2 and 3 of the table separate the sample geographically into the areas 
that remained republican and those that rebelled.  The effect of hierarchy found 
for the whole country appears to be driven by officers’ behavior in areas under 
republican control (Table 15 Column 2), where officers were 14.4 points more likely 
to revolt when senior officers supported the coup against the Republic. In the rebel 
area (Column 3), the leaders’ behavior did not have a significant impact on 
subordinates’ alignment. Despite the restriction of our sample to posted officers 
whose presence in the garrison can be determined, the remaining variables in the 
analysis do not show important changes in sign or significance with respect to 
regressions in Tables 5 to 7. 
                                     
47 When the leadership of the garrison was vacant, the authority is assumed to rely on the leader 
of the garrison or military unit above. 
48 Posted officers that Engel (2008) reported to be out of the garrison when the coup broke out are 
excluded from the sample because they were not under the direct authority of their superior. 
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These results for the effect of hierarchy must be taken with caution given the rough 
approximation of the chain of command in the Army and the lack of precise 
individual information for all officers’ geographical locations in July 1936.  Despite 
Engel’s impressive effort to synthesize available information, there is no exhaustive 
study of each officer’s geographical location during the coup. As the study of the 
Spanish Civil War progresses and more data becomes available, it is possible that 
more officers will be found to have been outside the garrison in July 1936 due to 
summer leaves or other motives. Nevertheless, the coefficients for “Follow” are 
significant and large enough to suggest that, at least in the republican areas, choices 
made by leaders had an impact on the choice of side made by subordinates. The 
different dynamics of the coup in areas under rebel control reduced the hierarchical 
effect. 
The analysis of hierarchy also adds to our previous discussion of the impact of 
demotions on officers’ alignments. In section 5.2., africanista officers were shown 
to be more likely to revolt against the Republic via the negative shock in their 
careers after promotions were revised. Table 16 analyzes the impact that some 
variables had on officers’ ranks in 1936. The dependent variable measures rank and 
goes from 1 (alférez after the 1935 Law, the lowest rank in the Spanish military) 
to 10 (corresponding to the highest rank held by the three Lieutenant Generals 
that remained in the Army). The positive coefficient associated with “Years Core 
Africa (1910-1927)” indicates that officers that were posted for more years to 
special African units held higher ranks in 1936. This result is significant even 
controlling for tenure (years in the army) to account for the fact that africanista 
officers were likely to be older than other officers because they were already in the 
Army before 1927.  Therefore, the revisions of officers’ positions negatively affected 
81 
 
officers’ loyalty to the Republic through two channels: first, it increased the 
likelihood of revolt for those officers whose position worsened and whose evolution 
on the scale was slowed down. Second, those officers more likely to be against the 
Republic could influence the alignment of an important number of officers, thanks 
to their higher ranks and the hierarchical effect in officers’ decisions. Africanista 
officers were more likely to act against the Republic through these two channels. 
VIII.2. Counterfactual Policies and Impact on Officers’ Chosen Sides  
The results suggest that republican authorities’ military policy decisions affected 
officers’ chosen sides during the Civil War. Promotions or demotions of officers 
under the Republic significantly relate to officers’ likelihood to revolt against the 
Republic in two senses. First, if the rank of Lieutenant General had not been 
eliminated in 1931, officers with the rank of Major or higher in that year would 
not have had worse promotion prospects and would have been more likely to 
support the Republic in 1936. Second, officers that promoted more rapidly during 
the Republic were less likely to revolt.  
Table 17 shows the results from a regression that estimates the impact that revision 
of promotions had on officers’ changes of position between 1931 and 1933. Results 
indicate that those officers whose positions were revised in 1931 or 1933 saw their 
total change in relative position reduced by 0.421 with respect to officers not 
subject to the revisions. In other words, had Azaña not implemented the revision 
and cancellation of some promotions, those officers that did experience revisions 
would have improved their relative position by 0.421 for the 1931-1933 period. 
Concerning the elimination of Lieutenant Generals, the coefficient of “Worse 
Prospects in 1931” in Table 8 suggests that holding rank constant, the probability 
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of rebelling would have decreased by 0.06 for those officers that held the rank of 
Major or higher in 1931. A word of caution concerning the interpretation of the 
coefficient for the variable “Worse Prospects in 1931” is needed. The variable is a 
dummy that takes the value 1 for officers having the rank of Major or higher in 
1931 and 0 otherwise. Among Azaña’s military reforms usually mentioned in the 
literature, only the progressive elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General can 
be directly linked to the interests and prospects of the group identified by “Worse 
Prospects in 1931”. The dummy variable may, however, capture some other 
(unobservable) resentment or aversion towards Azaña’s republican coalition among 
the officers that held the highest ranks in 1931 and were still active in 1936. For 
the moment, the worse professional and economic prospects after the access to the 
rank of Lieutenant General disappeared is the clearest explanation linking Azaña’s 
policies with 1931 high ranking officers’ greater likelihood to revolt in July 1936. 
In order to assess the distribution of officers in a counterfactual where Azaña did 
not cancel promotions and kept the rank of Lieutenant General, I proceed in two 
steps. First, I compute the change of position between 1931 and 1933 that would 
have occurred had officers not experienced revisions of promotions. The coefficients 
in Table 16 suggests that without revisions of promotions, officers would have 
improved their change in relative position between 1931 and 1933 by 0.421. Table 
8 shows that an increase of one unit in relative position between 1931 and 1936 
decreased the probability of rebelling by 0.031. Combining both results, a world 
without revisions of promotions between 1931 and 1933 would have resulted in a 
decrease of 0.031×0.421 in the likelihood of revolt for those officers that suffered a 
revision of promotions and were in republican-controlled areas in 1936. Second, 
Table 8 also suggests that keeping the rank of Lieutenant General would have 
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decreased the probability to revolt for those officers that had the rank of Major or 
higher in 1931 by 0.06. Combining the two results, it is possible to estimate officers’ 
probability to rebel in a scenario where promotions were not revised and the rank 
of Lieutenant General was kept. 
Predictions for officers’ probabilities to rebel in republican-controlled areas when 
using coefficients in Table 8 result in 1,070 officers remaining loyal to the Republic. 
The remaining 4645 officers are predicted to rebel. Using the counterfactual 
probabilities to rebel in a scenario without revisions of promotions and keeping the 
rank of Lieutenant General, 1129 officers are predicted to remain loyal to the 
Republic. Therefore, the direct effect of the counterfactual policies is a 5.5% 
increase in officers being loyal to the Republic in republican-controlled areas.   
An additional step is required to compute the total effect of the counterfactual 
scenario. Among the 59 officers that switched their predicted side as a direct 
consequence of the counterfactual policies, 31 (52.5%) held the highest rank in their 
garrison or military unit. Results in Column 2 of Table 15 suggest that the 
hierarchical effect of leaders passing from rebelling to being loyal would be a 0.144 
decrease in subordinates’ probabilities to rebel. The inclusion of the hierarchical 
effect in the counterfactual for republican-controlled areas results in 1355 officers 
predicted to be loyal. In other words, the estimated total effect of the 
counterfactual policies equals to a 26.6% increase in loyal officers in areas under 
republican control with respect to the probabilities estimated with coefficients in 
Table 8. 
How important could an increase in the number of officers who remained loyal to 
the Republic have been? Contest functions provide one means to perform a crude 
estimation of how the increase in loyal officers would have translated into greater 
84 
 
probabilities to win the war for the Republic. Contest functions are used to 
compute players’ probabilities to win in a contest. The probability of winning is 
usually assumed to be increasing with respect to one’s effort and decreasing with 
respect to other players’ efforts (see Jia et al., 2012, for a review). One possibility 
to model the probability of winning the contest as function of efforts with two 







  (2) 
Where 

,  represents player 1’s probability to win the contest and  stands 
for player i’s effort. 
In the case of the Spanish Civil War, the two contestants were the Rebel and the 
Republican Army. The effort can be (roughly) approximated by using the quantity 
of officers on each side. The constant µ is assumed to be equal to 1.  
The sample contains 2,356 loyal officers against 9,517 rebels. In other words, rebels 
consisted of 80.16% of officers and republicans consisted of 19.84%. Using the 
shares of officers as a proxy for the effort of each side in (2), the contest function 
yields a probability of 0.3536 for the Republic winning the War.49 Table 5 shows 
that 1,969 out of the 5,715 officers in areas under republican control remained loyal 
to the Republic. The 26.6% increase in loyal officers estimated in the counterfactual 
                                     
49 The low probability of victory attributed to the Republic is due to the naïf measurement of the 
effort of the two contenders in the Spanish Civil War. Despite the republican government could 
only count with one fifth of total officers, it held control of the main industrial cities in mainland 
Spain. Furthermore, during the first days of the Civil War rebels faced many problems to secure 
the supply of arms to the troops in the north of the Iberian Peninsula. The majority of the Navy 
and the Aviation remained loyal to the republic, so the transportation of rebel forces from Africa 
to mainland Spain was also very difficult during the first days of conflict (see Preston, 2007: 115-
116). Mussolini and Hitler’s help after August 1936 solved some of the most important logistic 
problems of the rebels. 
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would therefore result in 2,493 loyal officers and 3,222 rebel officers in republican-
controlled areas. In the whole country, the distribution of officers would have been 
2,880 loyal officers (24.26% of total) against 8,993 rebel officers (76.74%). Using 
the counterfactual shares of rebel and republican officers in equation (2), the 
probability of the Republic winning the Civil War would have been 0.3741. In other 
words, the implementation of alternative military policies would have resulted in 
a 2.05 point increase in the probability of the Republic winning the War.  
The computations for the distribution of officers in the counterfactual scenario 
reflect a partial equilibrium because they only take into account part of the effects 
of alternative military policies. The analysis does not consider how counterfactual 
promotions would impact careers after 1933 or those of officers not affected by 
revisions between 1931 and 1933. Given that more promotions in the counterfactual 
for officers that would have avoided revisions would reduce the possibility to 
promote or would crowd-out other officers from enjoying promotions, the omission 
of these effects could result in an overestimation of the importance of 
counterfactual policies to reduce officers’ likelihoods to rebel. However, the 
counterfactual also omits other potential channels that could increase officers’ 
loyalty towards the Republic. First, keeping the rank of Lieutenant General would 
have increased the possibility for upward mobility. With officers experiencing 
greater changes of position between 1931 and 1936, the likelihood for revolt would 
have been lower. Second, the hierarchical effects in the counterfactual are only 
computed within the garrison. The analysis omits the complex inter-garrison effect, 
that is, the impact that leaders that switch to be loyal in the counterfactual would 
have over leaders of subordinated garrisons or military units. These two channels 
would result in an underestimation of the ability of counterfactual policies to reduce 
the number of rebel officers. 
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The rough counterfactual estimates are presented as a way to get a handle on the 
question of “how big” were the effects.  The increase in the number of republican 
officers by 26.6% seems like a large number, but the increase in the probability 
that the Republic would win the Civil War by 2% seems like a small number.  The 
point of the empirical estimates, however, is not to show whether a different set of 
republican policies would have averted the rebellion or led to victory in the Civil 
War that followed.  The point is to show that the Army did respond to Republican 
policies, but that the Army did not respond in a monolithic way.  Groups with 
different interests did exist within the Spanish Army in the early 1930s, and the 

































Persistence and Change during the Second Republic 
”If we want things to stay as they 
are, things will have to change.”  
Tancredi 
Despite the differences in interpretations, both the defendants of the “block of 
power” and the “polarization view” contemplate a counterfactual that could have 
brought stability to the Republic: the formation of a broad, inclusive coalition. 
Casanova points out that “all the European republics that emerged in the 1920s 
and 1930s, except for Ireland, but including Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Greece, ended up threatened by reactionary forces 
and overthrown by Fascist or authoritarian regimes. And in all cases, not only 
Spain, the necessary criterion for the consolidation and stabilization of democracy 
was that a large majority of the population would accept, or at least tolerate, these 
new regimes that had been introduced so swiftly and with hardly any bloodshed” 
(2010: 36; see also Palafox, 1991: 288). Casanova emphasizes the failure of the 
Republic to consolidate a democratic majority capable of overriding the opposition 
of the old Spanish elites. In other words, reformists failed to consolidate a stable 
popular majority against the interests of landowners and other elites. Military 
violence, Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship were the ultimate consequences of 
this inability to control and neutralize political opposition and military violence. 
Supporters of the “polarization view” also ascribe to similar ideas when envisioning 
alternatives that could have brought stability to the republican regime. They argue 
that if the polarization and political violence produced by radical groups were the 
major problems during the Republic, a desirable counterfactual would have been 
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an inclusive, broad coalition of moderate parties. In his analysis of the breakdown 
of democracy in Spain, Linz points out that ”in order to consolidate itself, a new 
regime must do two things: implement policies that will satisfy a large number of 
potential supporters and link them to the regime, with negative effects on the 
smallest possible number of opponents; and follow policies that will satisfy the 
leadership of the coalition which installed the new regime, avoiding policies that 
would provoke dissent and splits in the coalition” (1978: 151). Alvarez and Villa 
adopt a similar perspective in their critique of the political program implemented 
by the liberal-socialist coalition during the two years of the republic. These authors 
argue that the left envisioned an exclusive (almost sectarian) republic that quickly 
alienated an important majority of Spanish society after the Constitution was 
passed in 1931. They compare the Republic to the Third French Republic (1870-
1940) and blamed liberal republicans for not being willing to implement the type 
of broad moderate coalitions that Gambetta established fifty years before in France 
(Alvarez and Villa, 2010: 43; see also Payne, 2006: 10 for a defense of the Third 
French Republic as appropriate historical counterfactual to the Republic).  
Both views implicitly assume that the main problem of the Republic was political: 
the Republic failed to find an adequate political compromise that would give 
stability to the country. Franco’s military coup and the implementation of 
questionable political decisions (partisan constitutional framework, ideological 
radicalization...) reflect the political failure. Tortella (1983: 133) summarizes this 
idea when he asserts that ”rather than economic, the problems during the 
[Republican] period were political.” In other words, the two approaches consider 
that democracy could have been self-sustaining as long as the Republic would have 
been able to form a moderate coalition that defeated the interests of old elites and 
was inclusive and moderate like the one formed by the Third French Republic. In 
contrast, I argue that the challenges democracy faced in the 1930s in Spain were 
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deeper and went beyond the purely political sphere or the willingness and ability 
to form a broad and moderate coalition. My focus to understand the dynamics of 
the Republic lies in the intra-elite competition that operated in an economic and 
political system that lacked the conditions for free entry and open competition, 
much like previous regimes did before 1931.  
My analysis leads to a distinction between persistence and change in the Republic. 
So far, the studies of the republican regime have emphasized its rupture with 
respect to previous regimes. The Republic extended political rights to the Spanish 
population and also redistributed power between elites’ factions as Chapter V 
shows for the case of the Army. However, in fundamental aspects, the Republic 
continued the dominant logic of the Spanish political and economic system before 
1931. Paraphrasing Tancredi’s quote, things changed to remain the same. This is 
not to deny the important reforms that the Republic implemented in the Spanish 
political system and other aspects of Spanish society. Enfranchising women, 
holding free and fair elections and aiming at extending education to all the social 
classes in Spain were important advances that increased the political rights and 
freedom of the Spanish population. However, the persistence of some fundamental 
characteristics of the Spanish political and economic sphere implied that the 
Republic did not operate in the open institutional environment that characterizes 
developed countries. My analysis of the Spanish political and economic system 
serves two purposes. First, the privilege-driven logic and lack of basic conditions 
for democratic turnout that persisted during the Republic provide an additional 
reason to focus on elites when studying the institutional dynamics of the Republic. 
The same economic tools that were used before 1931 to create coalitions of elites 
were also in place during the republican regime and we need to understand how 
they were used to favor a different group of elite factions. Second, my brief 
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incursion into the institutional arrangements during the Republic opens new 
potential fields of application for my view of the Republic beyond the case of the 
Army. This analysis, admittedly partial and somewhat impressionistic, should be 
taken as a first step in developing a more systematic study of the institutional 
arrangement in Spanish politics and economics during the Republic and how these 
two dimensions interacted and reconfigured elites’ power between 1931 and 1936.     
IX.1. Privilege in the Spanish Economy  
IX.1.1. The Spanish Financial System 
The financial system undertakes important changes in the process of economic 
development. The financial structure of developing countries is characterized by 
having few, small and not very specialized organizations (usually commercial 
banks). At the other extreme, developed countries have financial markets with a 
high degree of specialization and organizations that hold a much larger share of 
total financial assets (see Goldsmith, 1969). These differences between the financial 
structure in developing and developed countries only draw on economic aspects, 
but modernization of the financial system runs parallel to a change in the 
relationship between the government and the economic system of the country. The 
small size of the banking system in the early stages of development is, in part, the 
result of the government’s restriction of entry. Control of the number of 
organizations is usually achieved by requiring government-granted charters to 
create new financial organizations. Privileged individuals with close links to the 
government are in a better position to obtain charters and create new organizations 
that enjoy the oligopolistic rents created by restricted entry in the market. In 
return, governments can obtain revenue from chartered banks by taxing the banks’ 
rents or establishing the obligation to hold a given share of banks’ capital in the 
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form of government bonds (see Haber 2007), and from deriving rents from the 
oligopolistic privilege granted to a few financial institutions (see Wallis, Sylla, and 
Legler, 1994, for the case of nineteenth-century United States). Haber and 
Calomiris (2014) also analyze the Mexican case. One of the most important changes 
in the transition to a modern financial structure is the shift to free banking. The 
ability to create new organizations by following standard administrative steps 
opens the market to potential contestants and promotes competition. The result is 
a different dynamic in the relationship between the government and the banks. 
The Spanish financial system was not an exception to the logic that dominates 
non-developed financial structures. The first laws regulating the financial system 
(“Ley de Sociedades por Acciones” [Joint-Stock Company Law] of 1848, and both 
the Ley de Bancos de Emisión [Banks of Issue Law] and the Ley de Sociedades de 
Crédito [Credit Company Law] of 1856) established that any new bank had to 
obtain the approval of the government. Besides controlling access to financial 
markets, Spanish governments also reinforced their influence by creating public 
banks between 1872 and 1929 like the Banco Hipotecario de España (Spanish 
Mortgage Bank), the Banco de Crédito Industrial, the Banco de Crédito Local, and 
the Banco Exterior de España. The logic of privilege and “special relationships” 
were prominent in these institutions: they were given some privilege to issue 
particular types of bank notes (notably mortgage notes in the case of the Spanish 
Mortgage Bank). The banks loaned important amounts to the Spanish government, 
and they were protected from competition (Martín Aceña, 1991). The Spanish 
Central Bank was also given the monopoly on issuing paper money in 1874. 
When the Republic was declared in 1931, the Spanish financial system had made 
important progress with respect to nineteenth-century standards: the Spanish 
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system had experienced a sustained increase in the number of banks, those banks 
had grown larger and more specialized, and there was an increase in the ratio of 
financial intermediation, that is, the ratio of financial institutions’ assets to national 
product. However, the financial intermediation ratio in Spain was still below the 
French, British, German and American ratios, showing the relative backwardness 
of the Spanish financial system with respect to developed countries (Martín Aceña 
1987: 120-121). 
The financial structure of Spain did not experience important changes during the 
Republic. The number of banks in Spain declined from 127 in 1930 to 115 in 1935 
(García Ruiz, 1993: 600) in marked contrast with the 24,504 banks reported to 
exist in the United States in 1929 (Haber, 2008:32). Public banks represented more 
than 50% of total credit in Spain in 1935, not showing any significant shift with 
respect to the years and regimes before the Republic (Martin Aceña, 1991: 364). 
The difficult economic conditions of the 1930s surely played an important role in 
the previous trends, but, for our purposes, it suffices to notice that the Republic 
operated a similar financial institutional regime as the previous Spanish regimes.  
The institutions that dominated the financial system continued to manipulate 
entry into the Spanish banking system and to concede privileges with financial 
organizations to forge coalitions between powerful economic and political factions. 
This is an example of the continuity and change during the Republic: the logic 
dominating the financial sector was not very different from the one that prevailed 
in previous regimes, but the Republic could use those same instruments to favor 
building a new coalition that favored different factions and groups. Understanding 
the way that republican regimes used the regulation of the financial sector could 
shed light on the support and animosities that the Republic generated among elite 
factions. An extension of the logic developed here for the case of the Army would 
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focus on the financial elites, the way they were benefited or harmed by republican 
financial reforms and how the impact of financial reforms relates to their willingness 
to side with one side or the other during the Civil War. 
IX.1.2. Trade Regulation: the Political Economy of Protectionism 
The logic of privilege that restricted access to markets was one of the reasons for 
the protectionism that prevailed in twentieth-century Spain. In his classic study of 
the logic of collective action, Olson (1971) derives the following condition for the 
provision of a public good: Fi ≥ C/Vg, where Vg stands for the group “g” gain, Fi is 
the fraction of Vi accruing to individual i, and C is the cost for I of acting to obtain 
the public good. Given that tariffs and other protectionist policies for a given 
industry are public goods for all the firms in an industry, this analysis helps us 
understand the determinants that any particular firm has to push for protection.  
It seems reasonable to assume that Fi is monotonically decreasing with respect to 
the number of firms operating in the sector.1 This means that oligopolistic or 
monopolistic firms have greater incentives to lobby for the protection granted by 
the government. The oligopolistic nature of the industry might be due to purely 
economic factors (e.g. high fixed costs or pure economies of scale) but also, as the 
example of the bank industry showed, to the government restricting access to 
markets. Consequently, the privileges that the government concedes to particular 
groups or organizations can translate into concrete trade policies like tariffs or 
protectionist policies benefitting some organizations in particular sectors.  
In his study of African countries during the second half of twentieth century, Bates 
(2005) shows how trade regulations are used by governments to benefit and form 
                                     
1 There exists the possibility of a market with an oligopolistic structure with a leader firm and 
followers. If followers remain so independently of the size of the market, their Fi might remain 
constant independently of the market composition.  
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coalitions with elites and powerful groups in the country. Effective protection over 
some industrial sectors is used as part of industrialization programs and to restrict 
foreign competition and decrease the price of inputs in an attempt to forge a 
coalition with urban elites. Bates’ examples also extend to other policies like import 
licenses (granted to groups loyal to the government) or the foreign-exchange 
controls that often go hand-in-hand with attempts to cope with trade deficits and 
limit the imports of the country.   
Protectionist tools were widely used in Spain. The end of the nineteenth century 
marked a protectionist turn in the Spanish trade policy, reinforced during the first 
third of the twentieth century with the “Ley de Bases Arancelarias” (1906) and the 
Cambo’s Tariff (1922). The Republic continued protectionist policies and the 
creation of committees that regulated trade in Spain. If anything, rather than a 
break with respect to previous regimes, the Republic reinforced and expanded the 
existing protection and regulation of the Spanish economy (Fraile, 2000; Comin, 
2001). During the rule of lthe iberal-socialist government (1931-1933) Cambo’s 
Tariff was maintained and new special tariffs were approved in 1931 and 1933. The 
government also implemented exchange controls and import quotas. A decree 
passed on April 4, 1931 extended government support to some industries. The 
conservative government in power after January 1934 also created committees in 
charge of protecting and regulating the market for wheat and other sectors of 
Spanish agriculture. Even industries that were competitive at the beginning of the 
twentieth century (e.g., steel2) used tariffs and other regulatory tools to protect 
                                     
2 Steel is one industry in which purely economic factors (e.g. economies of scale derived from high 
fixed costs) might lead to an oligopolistic structure. The Spanish steel industry showed a greater 
degree of concentration than the other European countries (Fraile, 1991). This could indicate some 
degree of privilege granted by the state, but, more research on the structure of the industry and 




their oligopolistic structure and preserve the national market from foreign 
competition.  
I argue that protectionism and legislative action during the Republic are useful in 
understanding the type of coalitions that republican governments tried to form 
with particular economic groups. The protectionist and other trade regulatory tools 
that previous regimes used to form coalitions with some groups and organizations 
were also part of republican regimes’ economic toolkits. Once again, the shifting 
nature of the coalition that dominated the Republic (i.e. the change in groups that 
benefited from economic privilege and regulations once the Republic was 
established) was built and evolved over a persistent, non-competitive institutional 
arrangement that had dominated the Spanish economy before 1931. The Republic 
changed the nature of the ruling coalition, but, as the example of trade regulation 
shows, did not alter the fundamental logic that dominated the economic 
institutional arrangements in Spain. There are two possible objections that can be 
raised against the claim that trade policy is another example of how republican 
governments kept manipulating the economic system to attract the support of some 
economic elites: the official motivation behind protectionist policies and the 
widespread use of protectionism and trade regulation as a result of the Great 
Depression.  
The laws that created new tariffs and protected Spanish markets from foreign 
competition were usually motivated by invoking nationalist arguments against 
foreign interference in the Spanish economy. The arguments depended on an 
immense optimism about the possibilities of the country to rely on its resources, 
and even defended the efficiency of autarky (San Roman, 2001). It is not surprising 
that the decrees and laws creating new tariffs did not mention the privilege given 
to some groups. As Bates shows, those economic privileges and rents favor one 
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minority (the producers in the industry or the groups allowed to overcome import 
restrictions) and harm the rest of the society, which has to pay higher prices for 
the protected industries or goods. Mentioning these effects would not have helped 
to make the laws more popular or acceptable. Despite the sectors that might have 
defended the supposed benefits of autarky, Spanish economists did not ignore the 
gains of trade and were even politically active in denouncing the inefficiencies 
generated by tariffs and other regulatory devices in place. In Francisco Comin’s 
words, “pressure from politicians and lobbies prevailed over [economists’ proposals]” 
(Comin, 2001: 943).3 The competitive, open economic system described by 
economic theory clashed with the logic that prevailed in Spain before and during 
the Republic.  
The second objection that can be raised against the claim that protectionist and 
trade regulations during the Republic were a continuation of the strategy followed 
by previous regimes in Spain to favor some sectors and organizations focuses on 
the international economic environment in which the governments of the Republic 
had to operate. When facing the deep economic problems after 1929, many 
countries reverted to protectionism, exchange controls, and import quotas. It could 
be argued that, despite a hypothetical desire to open the Spanish economy, the 
republican governments in Spain were dragged by the protectionist flow that had 
overwhelmed European economies and the decrease in economic freedom 
experienced by Western European economies (Prados de la Escosura, 2014). The 
problem with this argument is that, as Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) have shown, 
the protectionist answer to the Great Depression mainly came from countries that 
stayed on the Gold Standard. Governments faced the alternatives of deflation 
                                     
3 “...las presiones de los políticos y de los grupos de interés acabaron imponiéndose a la racionalidad 
de las propuestas [de los economistas]” 
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under the Gold Standard, currency depreciation, or direct controls over trade and 
payments to maintain gold and foreign exchange reserves. Those countries that 
decided to remain on the Gold Standard “resorted to protectionist policies to 
strengthen the balance of payments and limit gold losses” (Eichengreen and Irwin, 
2010: 872). Spain had de facto left the Gold Standard in 1883. The economic 
imperative to apply protectionist trade policies in Spain in reply to the economic 
crisis was, at best, weak.  
Thus, trade policy is another example of the mix of institutional persistence and 
change that existed during the Republic. Republican regimes changed the 
composition of the ruling coalition, but it did so through the same type of economic 
instruments used by previous regimes.  Trade policy is another example of the 
interest of focusing on intra-elite competition to study the life of the Republic and 
offers another potential field of study for future research on the type of coalitions 
that republican governments attempted to establish with Spanish economic elites 
other than the Spanish Army. Which factions and economic groups won with the 
republican trade policy? Which factions lost the effective protection they had 
enjoyed until the arrival of the Republic? How did these changes in trade policy 
relate to a faction’s willingness to support the Republic when the Civil War broke 
out? 
IX.2. The Spanish Political System during the Second Spanish Republic: the Absence 
of Legitimate Opposition  
While there is little doubt that the political systems in today’s developed countries 
are democracies, the exact definition of “democracy” is still a subject of debate. 
Alexis de Tocqueville noted the problem in defining “democracy” two centuries ago 
when he pointed out that “it is our way of using the words “democracy” and 
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“democratic government” that brings about the greatest confusion” (quoted by 
Sartori, 1987: 3). Recent developments in political science have not helped to clarify 
things because there is no mainstream definition of democracy. Ben Yishay and 
Betancourt (2014) distinguish between those scholars that provide a minimalist 
definition, in which the defining characteristic of a democracy is that free elections 
are held, and those that adopt a wider view of democracy, encompassing the 
protection of civil and political liberties. Among the proponents of the former view, 
Acemoglu and Robinson characterize a democratic society as one in which “there 
is one-person-one vote” [2006:24]. Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy  as “…the 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote” (p. 48)”. Tilly is a proponent of the latter vision. In Democracy, Tilly points 
out that “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the 
state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding 
consultations” (2007: 13) adding that “…roughly speaking, political rights 
correspond to broad, equal, mutually binding consultations, whereas civil liberties 
refer especially to protection” (p. 45). 
Finding a unique or consensual definition of democracy is beyond the scope of this 
work. Furthermore, these definitions are concerned about defining if a political 
system is democratic at a given moment of time. The study of the Republic and 
its failure to consolidate democracy in Spain relates to a different, more dynamic 
question: which conditions are necessary to sustain democracy over time?4 This is 
                                     
4 To be clear, Acemoglu and Robinson are also concerned about the conditions for sustaining 
democracy and devote two chapters in their book to democratization and the consolidation of 
democracy. The full quote above is “A democratic society is not only one where there is one-person-




an extremely complex question for which social sciences do not provide a clear 
answer. In The Idea of Party System, Richard Hofstadter identifies one condition 
that, if not sufficient, seems necessary to sustain democracy over time: the 
emergence and consolidation of a “legitimate opposition”. Hofstadter writes about 
the acceptance of political parties as legitimate contenders in elections in 
nineteenth century United States of America. Competitive one-person-one vote 
elections require that, if an incumbent party is defeated, it recognizes the legitimacy 
of the other party to gain power and govern. Hofstadter identifies the concept of a 
“legitimate opposition” as key in the emergence of a party system. Legitimate 
opposition must be constitutional (directed certain policy or political program, not 
against the legitimacy of the constitutional government itself), responsible (defends 
a set of policies that it thinks are feasible given the historical and economic 
framework), and effective (its possibilities of winning office are real). Haber neatly 
summarizes that a legitimate opposition is “one that uses formal institutions to 
oppose the policies of the government, rather than oppose the government itself” 
(2008:17).5 
The fact that Spain did not enjoy a fully developed democracy has not escaped the 
notice of historians. Casanova points out that “the political system was shaky and, 
as occurred in all the countries of Europe, with the possible exception of the United 
Kingdom, the rejection of liberal democracy in favour of authoritarianism was rife” 
(2010: 148). Payne also comments that “in 1931 Spain inhabited a dangerous 
‘frontier zone’ in which its new political institutions would attempt to approximate 
those of advanced northern Europe but in which its society and culture, despite 
                                     
5 Note that the existence of a legitimate opposition that fulfills Hofstadter’s characteristics is also 




recent rapid progress, had still not achieved levels equivalent to those of northern 
countries” (2006: 11). The problems of consolidating the idea of “legitimate 
opposition” during the Republic is a concrete example of the “shakiness” or lack of 
democratic culture in which the Republic operated. Despite acknowledging the 
flaws and limits of the Spanish political system, Casanova and Payne fail to 
integrate the flaws into their analysis of the Republic.  They continue to think 
about big, moderate, and inclusive coalitions when they propose counterfactuals or 
conditions needed to stabilize the republican regime. My brief incursion on the 
logic that dominated the Spanish political and economic system, however, suggests 
an institutional equilibrium dominated by privilege and limited access that points 
to elites (and their factions) as the key actors.  
The short history of the Republic is full of examples in which one side of the 
political spectrum questioned the ability of the other side to govern. Proponents of 
the “polarization view” often blame the 1931 Constitution for alienating and 
excluding important sectors of the Spanish economic and political system (e.g. see 
Alvarez and Villa, 2010). However, conspiracies and animosity towards the regime 
were in place well before the Constitution was debated and approved by the 
government elected in June 1931. In April 1931, only days after the Republic was 
established, monarchical political forces started to plot in conjunction with 
members of the Spanish Army. The conspiracy involved meetings and fundraising 
to overthrow the republican regime. In December 1931 the magazine Acción 
Española was created. The journal became one of the main channels for radical 
conservative opposition to the Republic and provided some of the most significant 
arguments in favor of a military intervention to put an end to the reformist agenda 
of the republican-socialist government (Gonzalez Calleja, 2011: 28-57). These 
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conspiracies crystallized in the 1932 failed military coup against the republican 
government led by General Sanjurjo.  
The 1936 coup was much more successful, destabilizing and finally overthrowing 
the republican regime.6 The 1936 coup happened in a moment in which the CEDA 
(the most important conservative political party7) had shifted away from the idea 
of legitimate opposition. The CEDA had traditionally been divided between 
“accidentalists” –those that argued that the form of government is accidental rather 
than fundamental- and “catastrophists” –enemies of the Republic that thought that 
it had to be overthrown by some uprising and catastrophe. The accidentalist 
strategies defended by Gil Robles8, the leader of the CEDA, until 1936 were 
defeated by the catastrophist postulates of more radical factions within the party 
in 1936. After the victory of the Popular Front in 1936, the strategy of the 
conservative opposition became “more concerned with destroying the Republic than 
with taking it over” (Preston, 2003:83; see also Gonzalez Calleja, 2011:285-89). 
The center and center-left of the republican spectrum also show important 
deviations from Hofstadter’s concept of legitimate opposition. After the victory of 
conservative parties in the elections of 1933, representatives of liberal republican 
parties (including Manuel Azaña) and the socialist party pressed the president of 
the Republic and the prime minister to cancel the results and form a new all-leftist 
coalition government (Payne, 2006:41). Even more worryingly, factions of the 
                                     
6 The second half of the dissertation studies in much more detail the political relevance of the Army 
in the political context of the Republic and the motivations behind the 1936 military coup. 
7 The Partido Radical –despite of its name, a moderate republican center-right party that had ruled 
between 1934 and 1936 in conjunction with the CEDA- had lost most of its strength due to many 
corruption cases that involved some of its most important leaders. 
8 Sometimes Gil Robles’ postulates in the debates between accidentalists and catastrophists were, 
at best, ambiguous. In an interview published by the newspaper Renovación on January 2, 1934 
the leader of the CEDA affirmed that if the revision of the Constitution that he was planning as 




Socialist Party (a member of the ruling coalition of 1933) turned to more radical 
postulates after the electoral defeat and contributed to the armed insurgency in 
Asturias in October 1934. Indalecio Prieto, allegedly a member of the moderate 
faction of the Socialist Party, even smuggled weapons to organize the workers’ 
revolt in Asturias. 
These are impressionistic but significant examples of the great distance between 
the reality of the Spanish political system during the Republic and the idea of 
legitimate opposition.  This is true even when we look at the biggest parties in the 
governing coalitions during the Republic.  The distance was even more striking in 
the smaller and more radical organizations in the Spanish political system on both 
sides.  
A small group of intellectuals, usually belonging to or close to the most conservative 
groups of the Catholic Church, developed a critique of the Republic based on the 
natural law premise that power and authority can only come from God. 
Interestingly, proponents of these ideas characterized the republican liberal-
socialist in power between 1931 and 1933 as a “tyrannical government”9 and 
justified the legitimacy of any uprising aimed at overthrowing it (Gonzalez Calleja, 
2011: 57-66). The far left logically invoked a different threat than an atheist 
tyranny looming over Spain, but its public discourse on the political reality in 
Spain was also dominated by a totalitarian threat: fascism. Indeed, fascism was 
everywhere: 
“By 1933 it had become increasingly common for many different groups to call 
their opponents fascists. This practice was most indiscriminate among the 
Communists, who often called Socialists “social fascists” while also labeling the 
                                     
9 Calvo Sotelo, one of the main political figures on the right, raised a similar idea when he talked 
about “the republican dictatorship” in one of his articles published in the newspaper La Nación (10-
27-1931, pp. 1-2). 
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democratic Republic “fascist” or “fascistoid”. The liberal democrats of the 
Radical Party were termed “integral fascists”. The CNT [an anarchist trade 
union] repaid the Communists in their own coin, calling Stalinist Communism 
“fascist”, while also sometimes referring to “Republican fascism” and the “social 
fascism” of the Socialists. Some Catholics, in turn, had called the heavy-handed 
Azaña government [1931-1933] “fascist”” (Payne, 2006: 64) 
The denunciation of tyranny or the denunciation of the fascist danger show 
parallels with some of the political ideas and threats expressed by other thinkers 
in eighteenth-century Britain or United States. Bailyn (1967) describes how the 
ideas and reality of British politics during eighteenth-century created an immense 
fear of factions and conspiracies that were seen as threats to the mixed government 
deemed to preserve liberties in the country. If conspiracies and corruption10 
triumphed, the result would be tyranny and slavery. These same fears travelled 
from Britain to the British colonies and are at the root of some of the most 
important political works of the time. For example, Madison’s Federalist Paper n. 
10 where he explores the best design of a union suited to “break and control the 
violence of faction”. The concept of legitimate opposition and the acceptance of 
political parties as contenders in the political arena are taken for granted in 
developed countries, but they are the result of a long historical evolution. The 
United States that Hofstadter studies are not the only example: France, another 
“first-mover” in developing an open political and economic system, fully legalized 
mass parties in 1901 (Przeworski, 2010: 23). 
The fear of faction in eighteenth century Britain and the fear of fascism in Spain 
during the Republic can be interpreted as paranoid exaggerations of the time,11 but 
                                     
10 See Wallis (2006) for the notion of “systemic corruption” as understood in republican theory and 
eighteenth century Britain and United States as opposed to the modern notion of “venal corruption”. 
11 Needless to say, the fear of faction in the 1930s was justified. Here I am only referring to abuse 




only if the analysis fails to integrate a complementary aspect of Spanish 
institutional design: the structure and logic of the Spanish economy. NWW (2009) 
developed the idea of a “double balance” according to which the control of violence 
in any given social order implies mutually reinforcing links between economics and 
politics. In other words, politics and economics are not independent but reinforce 
each other. The fear of fascism or tyranny in Spain in the 1930s reflected a deeper 
truth about the Spanish social order: the political system during the Republic was 
threatened by powerful groups that could take over the Spanish political and 
economic system. Lapuente and Rothstein (2013) show the politicization of the 
Spanish bureaucratic system during the Republic. Both sides (liberal and 
conservative governments) used patronage networks and politically-appointed 
administrative posts to influence electoral results in many districts and reward 
(punish) political friends (enemies). More importantly for the idea of double 
balance, the politicization of the bureaucratic system also translated into the 
economic sphere. Economic institutions in Spain were characterized by privilege 
and the absence of competition in many important senses. The forces in control of 
the political system could reward and redistribute economic power to particular 
groups to favor some concrete group of elites and organizations. 
IX.3. Implications: Elites, the Key Actors  
My analysis suggests that the economic and political spheres were not competitive. 
The concession of certain economic privileges by restricting access to the market 
or protecting certain sectors benefited some factions and excluded others. The focus 
on elites, their factions, and the conflicts between them is partly consistent with 
the “block of power view” and its emphasis on the role that conservative elites 
played in finishing the Republic. However, this traditional view of the Republic 
frames the conflict in an “elites vs. masses” model. The logic of privilege that 
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dominated the Spanish economy and the lack of a legitimate opposition were part 
of an institutional arrangement dominated by intra-elite fight, rather than a 
conflict between (monolithic) elites against the masses. Contrary to radical 
collectivist pressures, the Republic preserved its “bourgeois character” so the 
beneficiaries of tariffs, import licenses or bank charters were organized elites, not 
the masses or the Spanish proletariat. The heterogeneous character of elites and 
the conflict of interests between their factions made that those groups not 
benefitting from the privilege and arrangements devised by the ruling coalition had 
incentives to conspire and overthrow the regime in place to establish a new one 
that would be more in line with their interests. 
My intra-elite perspective offers a new way to interpret some of the concepts that 
the literature on institutional development and political science have developed to 
understand the process of change and political survival of a given regime. Take the 
case of the idea of “selectorate” presented by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, 
and Morrow (2004). They define the “selectorate” as “the set of people whose 
endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to 
choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private 
benefits doled out by the government’s leadership” (2004: 42). The selectorate is 
also described as the group of people that are citizens and therefore have the right 
to vote or the political rights that lead to choose the people in government. Despite 
the Republic’s opening elections to all the Spanish population that had reached the 
age of 23, my analysis of the Spanish political and economic system suggests that, 
if we want to understand the relevant group of agents and organizations that were 
key not only to choosing the government but also to determining its stability (or 
instability) during the Republic, we need to focus on intra-elite dynamics.  
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As much as elites’ support or animosity determined the fate of regimes before 1931 
(Tuñón de Lara, 1967), the same held true during the Republic.  Despite holding 
the most free and fair elections up to that date, the logic of the economic system 
during the Republic and the lack of fundamental conditions for democratic 
turnover persisted. The Republic changed the nature of the coalition that ruled 
Spain while the institutional arrangements that characterized Spanish social orders 
largely persisted. 
My approach shares some important characteristics with the traditional views of 
the Republic. First, I highlight the central role that the control (or lack of control 
of) violence had during the republican regimes. Either by focusing on conservative 
elites or radical workers’ organizations, the “block of power” and the “polarization 
view” also stress violent opposition to the Republic as the key to understanding its 
failure to consolidate democracy. Any view of the republican regime must look for 
the sources of conflict and the incentives that political and economic agents had to 
rise against the Republic. My view focuses on the intra-elite conflict between those 
factions that won with republican reforms and those that lost. Second, my view 
shares the perspective on internal dynamics adopted by the two traditional views 
rather than explaining the failure of the Republic through international factors. It 
is true that the international environment made the life of the republican regime 
more difficult. The Republic was established in a difficult international economic 
environment and there is little doubt that the crisis affected the (few) sectors in 
Spain that had access to international markets (Palafox, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
Great Depression had a relatively small impact on the Spanish economy because 
the foreign sector was small (less than 20% of national income in most of the years 
between 1900 and 1936 (Tortella, 2001: 310)) and the country did not suffer 
deflationary pressures. Spain had abandoned the Gold Standard in 1883 and this, 
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together with persistent trade deficits, led to the devaluation of the peseta. The 
devaluation of the Spanish currency softened the impact of the crisis on prices and 
exports (Palafox, 1991: 149-163). Finally, the banking system did not collapse as 
in Germany, Austria or Italy (Tortella, 1983). The international interference during 
the Civil War (Hitler and Mussolini’s military help to rebel troops being decisive 
for their victory) took place after the final crises had broken out, so it cannot be a 
valid explanation for the reasons leading to the instability of the Republic. All 
these factors point to the internal dynamics of the Spanish social order when one 
explores the sources of instability and problems faced by the Republic. Much like 
the “block of power” and “polarization view”, my view focuses on internal, not 
international, factors. 
My view departs in some important ways from the ideas advanced by proponents 
of the “polarization view”. For example, Payne emphasizes the threats that 
socialist, anarchist, and radical organizations posed to the stability of the Republic: 
“The main responsibility in this situation [hate, sectarianism, and political 
polarization in 1936 Spain] was borne by those on whose shoulders 
government responsibility rested – the middle-class republican left of Azaña” 
(Payne, 1971: 101). 
There is no doubt that political violence stemming from anarchist and, after 1933, 
socialist organizations posed significant challenges to Spanish governments during 
the Republic.12 In 1934, the workers’ revolt organized by socialist trade unions led 
to almost two weeks of fights between the workers and the Army that resulted in 
1100 rebel workers dead, 300 victims belonging to Spanish security forces, and 2000 
persons wounded. However, despite the activism of workers’ organizations, 
                                     
12 Anarchists were active well before 1931. They were responsible for many revolutionary strikes 
and terrorist attacks like the murder of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, father of the Spanish 
Monarchic Restoration, in 1897. 
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historical record is not consistent with anarchist or radical socialist organizations 
being able to overthrow the republican regime. Using Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
terminology (2006), in the Republic the revolutionary constraint did not appear to 
be binding. Anarchists were behind many efforts to subvert the legal order during 
the Republic. Between January 1932 and December 1933, the CNT organized three 
major national insurrections aimed at declaring libertarian communism all around 
the country. As Payne himself recognizes, the results were always the same: “each 
[anarchist revolutionary strike] failed to mobilize a broader revolt and was soon 
put down, each time costing scores of lives and bringing severe repression of the 
CNT” (2006: 23). Socialists also showed their ability to coordinate, together with 
anarchists, on a more serious revolt in October 1934. Despite the fact that the 
workers’ uprising in Asturias posed a more serious threat that led to significant 
losses of human lives, the conflict did not last more than two weeks after the Army 
intervened. 
Anarchists formed an inherently anti-elite party, but the socialists’ greater 
pragmatism during many periods of the Republic and previous regimes in Spain 
offers a more qualified balance: besides being an important agent in Primo de 
Rivera’s corporative state13, the Socialist Party was also a member of the coalition 
that ruled the Republic between April 1931 and November 1933. It was not until 
1934 (when the government of the Republic passed to center-right parties) that 
some factions of the Socialist Party openly confronted “the bourgeois regime”. 
Azaña’s decision to form a coalition with the Socialist Party instead of relying on 
the centrist Radical Party surely gave more radical overtones to the first years of 
                                     
13 The Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT, the socialist trade union) controlled 60% of workers’ 
posts in the work committees created by Primo de Rivera to regulate the Spanish labor market.  
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republican governments. Nevertheless the Republic never implemented a 
revolutionary program that transferred the control of the economy to the masses. 
Jurados Mixtos (mixed juries formed by members of trade unions and employers) 
gave more power to workers in regulating the labor market (Domènech, 2013), and 
the agrarian reform discussed between 1931 and 1932 contemplated some 
expropriations to help settlements of landless peasants. Still, after parliamentary 
debate, expropriations were restricted to a small portion of land, and there were 
not significant changes in the way industries were managed. The Republic was a 
bourgeois regime far from the libertarian communist or socialist projects vindicated 
by anarchists and the radical wing of the Socialist Party.14 
The adequacy of the intra-elite perspective I propose to understand the Republic 
is supported by Lapuente and Rothstein’s research on the politicization of the 
Spanish bureaucracy (2013). Lapuente and Rothstein show that electoral 
mobilization in Spain came before an impersonal bureaucracy developed. The result 
was a politicized administration that developed patronage and clientelistic 
networks. The privilege that dominated important sectors of the Spanish economy 
(§IX.1) points to a deeper problem behind the republican inability to consolidate 
a democratic and competitive social order in Spain: politics and economics 
reinforced each other in a double balance dominated by elite organizations that 
distributed and fought amongst themselves for political power and control of rents. 
It is therefore possible to use Lapuente and Rothstein’s explanation for the lack of 
                                     
14 To be clear, I do not pretend to disproof the “polarization view”. The claim that left-wing groups 
were unable to mount an effective threat to the social order during the Republic is still compatible 
with the “polarization view” if people fear that they would (a belief that became more realistic and 
likely when the political climate became more polarized in the spring of 1936). This shifts the focus 
of the debate to the beliefs held by political and economic agents during the Republic (i.e. the 
Republic broke down because there existed a widespread belief on the existence of an imminent 
radical leftist threat that pushed many groups to act to avoid it). If we take this “belief version” of 
the “polarization view”, the main difference with my view is that I deal with the realities that 
characterized the political and economic Spanish systems, not agents’ beliefs.  
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rule of law in Spain  to characterize the interactions between politics and economics 
and the leading role of elites: “if the government by party X did not take advantage 
of the extensive control of the state apparatus [and economic policies] in the 
moment it had the upper hand, it would regret this when party Y (re-)gained 
power because it could be taken for granted that the party in power had the 
opportunity (...) to undertake a policy implementation benefiting its core 
supporters” (2014: 9). 
The parties in power that benefited their core supporters were operating in a 
political and economic environment that lacked some basic conditions for open 
entry and competition. The politicization of the Spanish bureaucracy found by 
Lapuente and Rothstein was the consequence of the logic that dominated the 
political and economic sphere in the Republic. The characteristics of the political 
and economic spheres discussed in this chapter were the two sides of the same coin 
that sustained a social order based on privilege, limited access to markets, and the 








“Continuez!” [“Keep on!”] 
    A. Gorz (quoted in Van Parijs, 2009) 
Ideology has played an important role in understanding the Spanish Civil War. 
The conflict has often been portrayed as a fight between fascism and communism 
that predated some of the tensions later developed during World War II. This 
ideologically-charged vision of the Civil War is rooted in the two opposite views of 
the life of the Republic that have traditionally dominated the debate: a “block of 
power view” that uses the “elites vs. masses” framework and blames conservative 
elites for the failure to consolidate democracy in Spain and the “polarization view” 
that points to left-wing organizations’ radicalism and sectarianism to understand 
the breakdown of the republican regime.  
By looking at the logic that dominated the Spanish political and economic system, 
this dissertation points to a new view that emphasizes intra-elite conflict to 
understand the life of the Republic. Despite the reforms performed by republican 
regimes and the increase in political rights of the Spanish population, the Republic 
continued to operate in a political and economic environment that did not 
substantially alter the institutional arrangements in previous regimes. The lack of 
development of a legitimate opposition and the privilege-driven logic that 
dominated the economic system points to the pertinence of a view that emphasizes 
the role of elites, elites’ interests, and the way republican policies affected and 
redistributed political and economic power between factions. Moreover, as 
illustrated by the case of the Army, elites were not homogeneous groups but were 
divided into factions that held different and often opposing interests. The main 
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conflicts that threatened the stability of the Republic were not of “elites vs. masses” 
but “elites vs. elites.” 
Economic historians dealing with institutional development often face a tension 
between the contingency of the case under study (the historical part) and the 
generality ambitioned by the model used to interpret the process of economic and 
political development. The alleged singularity of the Spanish case with respect to 
other Western countries is reinforced by some elements of its history, like the motto 
“Spain is different”. The motto gained certain popularity during Franco’s regime to 
promote the touristic appeal of the country, but also to justify facts like being a 
dictatorship in a mostly democratic Western Europe. The idea of Spain being 
different also connected with the romantic vision of the “Spanish pueblo” as an 
impulsive, temperamental, Latin community —particularly when compared to its 
European neighbors. This stereotyped view of Spain and its people has often been 
invoked when analyzing the development of anarchist and utopian movements in 
the Spanish countryside or even the instability of the country and its frequent 
conflicts and wars (e.g. Brenan, 1960). My analysis of the Spanish political and 
economic system in the 1930s has shown that Spain was not different. The lack of 
a legitimate opposition and the fear of factions and a totalitarian threat posed by 
rival parties were characteristic of the United States as late as the 1820s 
(Hofstadter, 1967). Fear of factions and the “winner takes all” logic (where “all” 
often includes political rivals’ assets and even lives) are characteristic of non-
democratic regimes and have been the rule rather than the exception in human 
history until the nineteenth-century. Use of limited entry in markets, legal 
restrictions to creating organizations, and protectionist policies aimed at 
benefitting some particular industries or groups are also typical instruments used 
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in developing countries through history and today, as Bates has shown for the case 
of African countries. In summary, it is possible to place the Spanish case in a much 
broader frame of institutional development that shares some important 
characteristics with other Western or developing countries. The specificity of the 
Spanish case (e.g. by studying the composition of Spanish elites and factional 
interests as I did with the Army) is compatible with putting the challenges and 
problems in establishing democracy in Spain in a more general institutional theory 
that goes beyond the contingencies of Spanish history.  
The Army seems a first pertinent step for applying my view for many reasons. 
First, the military has traditionally been seen as a homogeneous group that backed 
traditional ruling elites in Spain. I showed how considering the conflicts between 
corps or between geographical factions in the Spanish Army can help to increase 
our understanding of elites’ dynamics and behavior during the republican regime. 
Second, traditional views of the Republic explain the split of the Army in July 
1936 mainly through ideology: conservative officers joined the coup whereas liberal 
ones remained loyal to the Republic. There is little doubt that in some instances 
ideology played a role in determining officers’ attitudes towards the Republic. 
However, ideological explanations suffer important problems like the lack of data 
to identify officers’ ideological affinities. Another problem with ideological 
explanations is that they obscure other possible motivations behind elites’ agency 
during the Republic, like the links between the political and the economic spheres 
studied in Chapter IX. Gaining access to political power opened the possibility to 
manipulate the economic system in favor of loyal factions and groups. Sometimes 
the “ideology” is used as a black box that hides the complexity of the institutional 
arrangements and the interactions between the political and economic spheres in 
the Republic. It could also be the case that, as Przeworski points out, rather than 
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acting while guided by an ideal, “causality runs the other way: (...) protagonists 
want to do some things for other reasons and use philosophers [or ideology] to 
justify their positions” (2010: 9). Proponents of ideology as the main factor dividing 
the Army must find an appropriate way to deal with the problem of endogeneity. 
The identification of factional professional and economic interests and the study of 
how they were affected by legislation offers a more tractable way to study elites’ 
incentives to back or rebel against the Republic.  
The study of officers’ behavior in the Spanish Civil War shows that the republican 
military reforms performed between 1931 and 1933 had a significant influence on 
officers’ choices of side. The aviation corps (which benefited from more 
independence and greater economic rewards) was more loyal to the republican 
government. Officers that experienced more rapid promotion between 1931 and 
1936 were more likely to stay loyal to the Republic. Officers whose professional 
prospects were worsened after the rank of Lieutenant General was eliminated were 
more likely to rebel in July 1936. These effects are significant for officers in areas 
of mainland Spain that remained under republican control in the first days after 
the military coup that started the Civil War. In the areas that quickly fell to the 
rebels, 94% of officers joined the coup and factional and military reforms barely 
show any significant relationship to officers’ chosen sides. The different reaction of 
authorities in each area after the coup could be at the heart of officers’ different 
behavior in rebel and republican-controlled areas. Rebel authorities immediately 
established a highly coercive regime whereas republican authorities freed soldiers 
from obedience to their superiors and therefore gave greater freedom to the officers 
to choose their sides.  
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Contrary to the ideas widely argued about officers’ behavior during the Spanish 
Civil War and the 1936 military coup, results are not consistent with the africanista 
faction or infantry and cavalry officers being more likely to join the coup. The 
variable measuring officers’ proximity to the africanista faction is not statistically 
different from zero for the country as a whole or for areas under rebel control, and 
the effect of being in the africanista faction is negative (even if small) for rebel-
controlled areas. The africanistas’ shared culture and ideology does not seem to 
have induced a greater support for the coup by the faction. However, the results 
show that africanista officers were negatively affected by the revisions of 
promotions that Azaña implemented between 1931 and 1933. This could be the 
reason behind africanista officers’ lower change in position between 1931 and 1933 
as compared to officers that were never posted to Africa. The trend disappears and 
is even reversed during the ruling of center-right governments (1934-1936), when 
members of the africanista faction had greater improvements in their position and 
rank than officers never posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927. Professional and 
economic prospects during the Republic seem more relevant than ideology or 
culture in explaining the likelihood of africanista officers to join the coup. These 
results show the limits of focusing only on ideology to explain elites’ behavior 
during the Republic. 
The results for the influence of hierarchy on officers’ choices of side must be taken 
with caution until a detailed study of the chain of command in the Army and 
officers’ exact locations in July 1936 are available. The current results indicate that 
hierarchy was also a significant determinant of officers’ behavior in republican-
controlled areas. The fact that subordinates tended to follow their superiors’ sides 
and that africanista officers had higher ranks in the Army (and therefore could 
117 
 
command a higher number of troops) increases the importance of previous results 
relating the reforms of promotions and their negative impact on africanistas’ 
incentives to support the Republic. 
All in all, results suggest that the dynamics of the Republic and the 1936 military 
coup were more complex than the ideological block views that have dominated 
existing interpretations of the Republic’s failed democratic experiment. The way 
republican military policies relate to officers’ chosen sides during the Civil War is 
in line with NWW’s insights into the dynamics of developing societies and the 
mechanisms of elite formation. NWW explain that social orders in developing 
societies (“natural states” in their words) control violence forming elite coalitions 
through the creation of economic rents. The economic system is used to generate 
rents that are captured by elite factions that consequently find it in their interest 
to cooperate rather than fight.  
Azaña’s reforms of promotions, the elimination of ranks, and the changes in the 
rewards going to particular corps were policies that changed officers’ professional 
prospects and affected the distribution of economic rents among the different 
factions that coexisted within the Spanish Army. Results indicate that, at least in 
areas under republican control, those factions and officers that won with the 
republican military reforms were more likely to remain loyal to the republican 
regime led by Azaña. Had Azaña not implemented the revision of promotions and 
kept the rank of Lieutenant General, the counterfactual estimation suggests that 
the Republic would have counted with 26% more officers in the areas they 
controlled after the coup. A rough estimation using basic contest functions 
indicates that the increase in loyal officers would have translated into a 2% increase 
in the likelihood of the republican army winning the Civil War. 
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My work adds to the many advances that have been made in the last years to 
understand the life of the Republic. Despite the important work of historians to 
sort out and interpret the events and problems faced by the Republic, my view 
shows that, contrary to some claims, we are still far from being able to say that 
“the most relevant questions are already answered”. My focus on elites and factional 
conflict adds to the body of knowledge on the Republic that complements current 
traditional views and highlights new important aspects of the life and conflicts 
within the republican regime. This work is a first step in the study of institutional 
development and the co-evolution of the Spanish political and economic systems in 
the 1930s.  
When starting a dissertation, one (hopefully) has one specific question in mind for 
which the most concrete, rigorous, and precise answer is sought. However, it is 
usually the case that in the path towards the answer, one discovers more questions 
and limits of the current literature when addressing some of the aspects under 
scrutiny. The empirical application of my view to the military is only the initial 
step in a much broader research agenda. During its brief existence, the republican 
governments (particularly the ones in power between April 1931 and December 
1933) implemented an ambitious reform program that affected many aspects of the 
Spanish political and economic system. The partial evidence presented in Chapter 
IX shows the political logic that dominated the Spanish political and economic 
system during the Republic. A lot can be gained by further exploring the privileges 
and distribution of power in finance, trade regulation, and other Spanish economic 
sectors.  
We need to increase our understanding of the different factions and interests that 
coexisted within Spanish political and economic elites and the way republican 
reforms affected them. Understanding the redistribution of political and economic 
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power effected by republican governments will shed more light on factional 
opposition to the republican regime and the ultimate failure to consolidate 
democracy in Spain in the 1930s. The task goes beyond purely economic grounds. 
Hofstadter, Pocock, and Bailyn have provided magnificent accounts of the 
intellectual history of England and the United States and the role that fear of 
factionalism played in the political systems of those countries. We lack similar 
studies of Spanish politics during the Republic and before. Given the reinforcing 
character of politics and economics, more progress in this area will contribute to 
the study of the Spanish institutional development in the twentieth century. 
The last century and a half has seen the expansion of political and economic 
freedoms to many countries. Despite being a relative latecomer –at least with 
respect to other European and Western countries-, in the last decades Spain has 
joined the group of democratic countries with high income per capita. A lot has 
been accomplished since Franco’s death, but the country still has a long way to go 
to develop and consolidate its political structure and modernize its economy. The 
regional tensions with Catalans and Basques, the links between some financial 
organizations and regional governments that explain part of the most recent 
financial scandals, and rigidities in labor markets are only some of the most 
important challenges that Spain faces today. Some of these conflicts already existed 
during the Republic and point to the complex institutional challenges that Spain 
must face to consolidate its modernization. Far from being an exercise in erudition 
or an intellectual curiosity, the study of the Republic and the problems it faced in 
consolidating democracy offer valuable lessons for Spain’s long march towards 













Data for active officers in July 1936 come from two bibliographical sources: the 
Spanish Military Yearbook and Carlos Engel’s book El Cuerpo de Oficiales en la 
Guerra de España (2008). 
The Spanish Military Yearbooks were published by the Spanish Ministry of War 
every year and reflected the organization and composition of the military in 
January.1 I used Chapter IX in military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 to 
extract information on officers’ names and family names2, corps, ranks, positions 
within the military scale, dates of birth, and dates of entry in the Army. The 
information of officers in each year was transcribed into six different files. Each 
officer was given a unique identification number formed by merging the date of 
birth (with format DDMMYYYY3) with the date of entry in the Army (with 
format DDMMYYYY4). Officers that shared dates of birth and dates of entry in 
the Army were eliminated. This resulted in the loss of 248 observations (1.5%) in 
the 1931 Military Yearbook, 127 observations (1.02%) in 1932, 143 observations 
(1.16%) in 1933, 144 observations (1.16%) in 1934, 155 observations (1.2%) in 1935, 
and 400 observations (2.7%) in 1936.  
The individual ID for each officer is used to track his evolution between 1931 
(promotions, demotions, and eventual changes of corps) during the Second Spanish 
Republic. I also used Chapter VII (in military yearbooks between 1910 and 1918), 
Chapter VIII (in military yearbooks between 1919 and 1923), Chapter X (in 1924 
and 1925 military yearbooks), and Chapter XII (1926 and 1927 military yearbooks) 
                                     
1 Consequently, the Military Yearbook published in year “t” reflected the changes in composition 
and ranks occurred during t-1. The main exception is the Military Yearbook of 1936 which was 
published in April 1936 and therefore reflected the changes occurred between January 1935 and 
April 1936. 
2 Spaniards have two family names: the first corresponds to the father’s first family name and the 
second to the mother’s first family name. 
3 Where DD=Day of birth; MM=Month of birth; YYYY=Year of birth. 
4 Where DD=Day of entry in the Army; MM=Month of entry in the Army; YYYY=Year of entry 
in the Army. 
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to identify the officers that were posted to the African territories. Those chapters 
list the names of officers posted to each garrison and the city where the garrison 
was posted. I created a file for each year with the names and family names of those 
officers that were posted to garrisons in African territory. For every year between 
1910 and 1927 I created one file with the names of all the officers posted to Africa 
and another only with those officers posted to special African units to account for 
the “core” of the Africanista faction (see §VI.3). The names in the files for officers 
posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927 were matched to the names of active 
officers in 1936 to determine the number of years that they had been posted to 
Africa. Merge was done using name and family name with the Stata command 
mmerge.  
Engel (2008) contains information on officers’ names and family name, sides during 
the Civil War (republican, rebel, republican geographical loyal, rebel geographical 
loyal, neutral, or unknown), garrisons to which officers were posted in July 1936, 
and, whenever possible, the cities where the officers were in case they were on 
leave. I digitized and transcribed the data to obtain each officers’ side, name and 
family name, garrison where he was posted, city where the garrison was posted, 
city where the officer actually was when the coup broke out (in those cases where 
the officer was not in the garrison and the information is available), rank, and 
corps. 
The officers and information contained in Engel’s work were merged with the 
information transcribed from the 1936 Military Yearbook using each officer’s name 
and two family names as officers’ identification.5 The match was made using the 
                                     
5 Engel’s data set does not contain officers’ date of birth and entry in the Army, so I could not use 
the ID created to match officers between different years. I excluded from the match navy officers 
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Stata code reclink. This code uses record linkage methods to match observations 
between two datasets where no perfect key fields exist. The code assigns a match 
score to each pair of coupled observations through a bigram string comparator to 
assess imperfect string matches. The unique pairs of observation for which the score 
is superior to a predetermined threshold are matched. After trial and error, I found 
that the threshold 0.9961 was the best to match observations while correcting some 
eventual typos in the transcriptions of Engel’s data set and the 1936 Military 
Yearbook. 
Before the matching, some problems with namesakes and lack of information had 
to be solved. 59 officers (0.39%) in the 1936 Military Yearbook were eliminated 
because they did not have date of birth and/or date of entry in the Army. 
Furthermore, 101 officers (0.62%) were also lost due to namesakes. To minimize 
those losses due to namesakes, I kept the oldest officer among those that shared 
names and family names. The final sample of the 1936 Military Yearbook to be 
matched with Engel’s data set was formed by 15,098 officers (98.95% of the total 
initial sample). 14,189 officers from the 1936 Military Yearbook were matched with 
Engel’s data set with score 1 (i.e. they were perfect matches). 704 additional officers 
had a matching score higher than 0.9961 and could be matched with Engel’s 
corresponding observation. In summary, 14,893 officers (97.61%) were matched.
                                     
included in Engel’s data set and students of military academies (those type of officers were not 




































Table 3. Summary Statistics (Whole Country) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tenure 11870 22.26 8.48 5 59 
Rank 11873 3.36 1.52 1 10 
Leader 11873 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Posted 11873 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Military Districts      
Division 1 11836 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Division 2 11836 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Division 3 11836 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Division 4 11836 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Division 5 11836 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Division 6 11836 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Division 7 11836 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Division 8 11836 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Balearic Island 11836 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Canary Island 11836 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Western African District 11836 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Eastern African District 11836 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Rif 11836 0.01 0.07 0 1 
Ifni 11836 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Cape Juby 11836 0.00 0.04 0 1 
Rio de Oro 11836 0.00 0.02 0 1 
Gulf of Guinea 11836 0.00 0.03 0 1 
Rebel Variables      
Rebel 11873 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Rebel Area 11851 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Corps      
General Staff 11873 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Infantry 11873 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Cavalry 11873 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Engineers 11873 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Artillery 11873 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Aviation 11873 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Frontier Guard 11873 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Transportation 11873 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Civil Guard 11873 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Assault Guard 11873 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Factions and military policies      
Years Core Africa (1910-
1927) 11873 0.24 0.83 0 13 
Change position 1931-1936  11873 0.85 0.65 -2.78 3.09 
Worse prospects after 1931 11873 0.12 0.32 0 1 
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Figure 1. Rebel and Republican Areas (July 22, 1936)  
 
From The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century 
Spain by Paul Preston. Copyright © 2012 by Paul Preston. Used by permission of W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc. 
 
Table 5. Officers’ Side: Whole Country and by Area.  
 
Rebel Officers Republican Officers TOTAL 
Rebel-Controlled Area 5,751 93.74% 384 6.26% 6,135 100% 






1,969 34.47% 5,713 100% 
  39.43%   83.68%   48.22%   
TOTAL 9,495 80.14% 2,353 19.86% 11,848 100% 



































Table 9. OLS Analyzing Determinants of Officers’ Changes of Position between 1931 
and 1933 (Azaña’s Term as Minister of the War) 
VARIABLES Change Position 1932-1934 
    




Rank 1934 0.140*** 
 [0.007] 
Corps 1934  
Cavalry 1934 -0.180*** 
 [0.018] 
General Staff 1934 -0.488*** 
 [0.029] 
Infantry 1934 -0.226*** 
 [0.012] 
Engineers 1934 -0.008 
 [0.018] 
Frontier Guard 1934 0.181*** 
 [0.023] 







Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Change position 1932-1934 adds the change in relative 
position between 1931 and 1933. Tenure is the difference between 
1936 and officer’s year of entry in the Army. Rank 1934 is a 
variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 
1934 (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being 





Table 10. OLS Analyzing Determinants of Officers’ Change of Position between 1934 
and 1935 (Center-Right Governments). 
VARIABLES Change Position 1935-1936 
    




Rank 1936 -0.238*** 
 [0.003] 
Corps 1936  
   Cavalry 1936 0.117*** 
 [0.019] 
   General Staff 1936 0.138*** 
 [0.034] 
   Infantry 1936 -0.006 
 [0.013] 
   Engineers 1936 0.128*** 
 [0.018] 
   Frontier Guard 1936 -0.297*** 
 [0.021] 







Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Change position 1935-1936 adds the change in relative 
position in 1935 and 1936. Tenure is the difference between 
1936 and the officer’s year of entry in the Army. Rank 1936 is a 
variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample 
in 1936 (alférez law of 1935) and increases until reaching 10 for 






Table 11. Determinants of Suffering a Loss in Relative Position in 1931 or 1933. 
Probit Average Marginal Effects. 
VARIABLES Lost Position 1931 or 1933 
    




Rank 1934 0.013*** 
 [0.003] 
Cavalry 1934 0.107*** 
 [0.013] 
General Staff 1934 0.083*** 
 [0.015] 
Infantry 1934 0.055*** 
 [0.013] 
Frontier Guard 1934 0.079*** 
 [0.015] 
Civil Guard 1934 0.028* 
 [0.016] 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
Pseudo R2 0.2064 
Observations 7,468 
Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: The sample is composed of 1936 officers in the total 
sample that were active in 1934. The dependent variable Lost 
position 1931 or 1933 takes the value 1 when the officer had a 
lower absolute position in 1932 or 1934. Years Core Africa 
(1910-1927) measures the number of years that the officer was 
posted to special African units between 1910 and 1927. Tenure 
measures the years passed between officer’s date of entry in the 
Army and 1936. Rank 1934 is a variable that takes the value 2 
for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (alférez) and increases 
until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. Controls for corps 
















Table 13. Comparison between Results for Probit Average Marginal Effects, Logit Average Marginal Effects, and LPM. 



































  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES rebel rebel rebel 
Follow 0.074*** 0.144*** 0.008 
 [0.013] [0.025] [0.009] 
Officers’ individual covariates      
      
Tenure -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.003*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Rank 0.023*** 0.049*** 0.002 
 [0.004] [0.007] [0.003] 
Leader -0.045*** -0.020 -0.036*** 
 [0.017] [0.033] [0.013] 
      
Area (Rebel Area = 1) 0.197*** No No 
 [0.018]     
Corps      
Cavalry 0.040* 0.049 0.018 
 [0.021] [0.042] [0.015] 
General Staff -0.022 -0.027 -0.026* 
 [0.027] [0.052] [0.014] 
Infantry -0.019 -0.031 -0.023* 
 [0.016] [0.031] [0.012] 
Engineers 0.030 0.074* -0.006 
 [0.023] [0.042] [0.015] 
Aviation -0.124*** -0.143** -0.108*** 
 [0.031] [0.058] [0.020] 
Frontier Guard -0.077*** -0.106*** -0.069*** 
 [0.018] [0.036] [0.014] 
Transportation -0.008 -0.020  
 [0.180] [0.275]  
Civil Guard 0.006 0.040 -0.037*** 
 [0.020] [0.039] [0.014] 
Assault Guard -0.191*** -0.241*** -0.141*** 
 [0.027] [0.035] [0.024] 
Africa and professional 
prospects      
Years in Core Africa (1910-
1927) -0.012** -0.006 -0.008** 
 [0.006] [0.010] [0.004] 
Lost position 1931 or 1933 -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.003 
 [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] 
Worse prospects after 1931 0.012 0.044 -0.010 
 [0.016] [0.029] [0.012] 
Table 15 (Continued) 
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Military region      
Division 2 0.010 0.107*** 0.070*** 
 [0.023] [0.040] [0.011] 
Division 3 -0.082*** -0.105*** No 
 [0.022] [0.034]   
Division 4 -0.064*** -0.086*** No 
 [0.017] [0.027]   
Division 5 -0.012 No 0.073*** 
 [0.031]   [0.015] 
Division 6 0.013 0.007 0.096*** 
 [0.022] [0.038] [0.014] 
Division 7 0.082*** No 0.123*** 
 [0.031]   [0.015] 
Division 8 -0.012 -0.101 0.075*** 
 [0.027] [0.067] [0.013] 
Balearic Islands -0.011 -0.022 0.086*** 
 [0.024] [0.035] [0.018] 
Canary Islands 0.002 No 0.081*** 
 [0.035]   [0.016] 
Western African District 0.035 No 0.093*** 
 [0.031]   [0.013] 
Eastern African District 0.034 No 0.086*** 
 [0.038]   [0.017] 
Rif 0.048 No 0.104*** 
 [0.040]   [0.021] 
Ifni -0.124*** No 0.014 
 [0.036]   [0.017] 
Cape Juby -0.108 No 0.034 
 [0.071]   [0.033] 
Río de Oro -0.091 No 0.040 
 [0.131]   [0.063] 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.2389 0.1153 0.1438 
Observations 10,387 4,861 5,524 
Robust standard errors in 
brackets    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: If the officer is not a leader, Follow takes the value 1 if the leader of the 
garrison rebelled and 0 otherwise. If the officer is a leader in the garrison, Follow 
equals 1 if the leader in the unit or garrison above rebelled and 0 otherwise. For 





Table 16. Determinants of Rank in 1936 
  (OLS) 
VARIABLES Rank 1936 
    
























Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Rank 1936 takes the value 1 for the lowest rank 
in the sample (alférez law 1935) and increases until 
reaching 10 for the three Lieutenant Generals that 
remained in the Army in 1936. Years in Core Africa 
(1910-1927) reflects the number of years that the officer 
was posted in a special African unit (Mehal.la, Harka, 
Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, 
or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 
1927.Tenure is the number of years passed between an 
officer’s entry in the Army and 1936. Corps variables 








Table 17. Impact of Revisions of Promotions on Officers’ Changes of Position between 
1931 and 1933 (OLS) 
VARIABLES Change position 1931-1933 
    




Rank 1934 0.137*** 
 [0.007] 
Corps 1934  
Cavalry 1934 -0.154*** 
 [0.018] 
General Staff 1934 -0.461*** 
 [0.028] 
Infantry 1934 -0.238*** 
 [0.012] 
Engineers 1934 -0.009 
 [0.018] 
Frontier Guard 1934 0.185*** 
 [0.022] 







Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Change position 1932-1934 adds the changes in relative 
position between 1931 and 1933. Lost position 1931 or 1933 
takes the value 1 if the officer lost positions in his scale or was 
demoted one rank in 1931 or 1933 and 0 otherwise. Tenure is 
the difference between 1936 and officer’s year of entry in the 
Army. Rank 1934 is a variable that takes the value 2 for the 
lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (alférez) and increases until 






Table 18. Impact of Revisions of Promotions on the Africanista faction 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Lost Position 1931 or 1933 
    
Dummy Core Africa (1910-1927) 0.017*** 
 [0.001] 
Tenure Yes 
Rank 1934 Yes 
Corps 1934 Yes 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
Pseudo R2 0.217 
Observations 8,187 
Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: The sample is composed of 1936 officers in the total sample 
that were active in 1934. The dependent variable Lost position 1931 
or 1933 takes the value 1 when the officer had a lower absolute 
position in 1932 or 1934. Dummy Core Africa (1910-1927) takes the 
value 1 if the officer spent at least one year posted to special 





Table 19. Determinants of Officers’ Changes of Position between 1931 and 1933 
Excluding the Effect of Revisions of Promotions  
VARIABLES 
Change position 1932-1934 
Counterfactual without Effect 
of Revisions (OLS) 
    




Rank 1934 0.147*** 
 [0.007] 
Corps 1934  
Cavalry 1934 -0.175*** 
 [0.017] 
General Staff 1934 -0.458*** 
 [0.028] 
Infantry 1934 -0.223*** 
 [0.012] 
Engineers 1934 -0.009 
 [0.018] 
Carabineers 1934 0.220*** 
 [0.022] 







Standard errors in brackets  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Change position 1932-1934 adds the changes in relative position 
between 1931 and 1933 excluding the effect of revisions. Tenure is the 
difference between 1936 and officer’s year of entry in the Army. Rank 
1934 is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the 
sample in 1934 (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for officers 


















Results in Table 9 showed that africanista officers were promoted less often than 
peers with the same characteristics that were never posted to any special African 
unit between 1910 and 1927. Results in Table 18 suggest that this could be partly 
due to the revisions of promotions between 1931 and 1933. The positive coefficient 
associated with the variable “Dummy Core Africanista” indicates that those officers 
that spent at least one year in special African units between 1910 and 1927 were 
more likely to suffer a revision of promotions in 1931 or 1933. However, besides the 
revisions of promotions, there might be other channels that negatively affected 
africanista officers during Azaña’s mandate as Minister of the War. This annex 
measures the extent to which Azaña’s revisions explain the lower change of position 
and rank of the africanista faction during the first years of the Second Republic. 
I first compute a counterfactual for officers’ careers that eliminates the effect of 
revisions between 1931 and 1933. In the counterfactual, officers suffering a negative 
change in absolute position in 1931 and/or 1933 are assumed to keep their position 
on the scale (so their change in their relative position in that year is set equal to 
zero). Then, total change in position during liberal republican governments is 
calculated by adding changes in relative position between 1931 and 1933. The new 
total change of position without the effect of revisions is used in Table 19 to study 
how the fact of being an africanista officer affected changes in relative position 
during Azaña’s mandate as Minister of the War.  
The coefficient for years posted to African special units in Table 19 is -0.36 and 
significantly different from zero, meaning that there were factors beyond the 
revision of promotions that negatively affected africanista officers’ changes of 
position during the ruling of republican liberal governments. Given that Table 9 




when including the effect of revisions, Azaña’s cancellation of promotions can 
explain 32% of africanista officers’ worse professional progress between 1931 and 
1933. The remaining two thirds of the coefficient found in Table 9 can be attributed 
to some sort of discrimination against africanista officers when Azaña’s government 
determined promotions. The idea of some type of discrimination against the 
africanista faction is supported by the fact that members of that group did 
significantly better than peninsulares between 1934 and 1936 (see Table 10). This 
suggests that africanista officers did not share any unobservable characteristic that 
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